Reconciliation and Peace in Tajikistan
Mansi Mehrotra
(Paper presented at the Seminar on Tajikistan organized by Central Asian Studies Programme, SIS, JNU, on 16 April 2007)
The recent history of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) can be broken into five phases: first between 1985-1990 when the process of social and political transition in Tajikistan started with Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. It guided cultural, ethno-nationalist and religious movements in Tajikistan, which later developed into, second phase (1990-1992), when political confrontation, due to active and aggressive demands for political accommodation and compromise by the newly formed parties, i.e., Democratic Party, Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan, People’s Movement “Rastokhez”, National Cultural Public Unions “La’li Badakhshon”, “Oshkoro”, “Hisori Shodmon”, “Mehri Khatlon”, and “Ehyoi Mastchoh”, began.
In August 1991, the opposition united under the democratic-Islamist forces were able to oust the communist and instituted a short term government in Dushanbe (The alliance later came to be known as United Tajik Opposition (UTO) since November 1994). In September 1991, Tajikistan acquired sovereign status followed by the third phase (mid-1992 to June 1997) saw the rise of aggressive nationalism amongst Pamiris and Qarategni-Garmi was seen as a threat by Khojandi (the traditional ruling elite) and their supporters, i.e., militia group of Kulyabis and Hissaris. This led to the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan.
The causes for civil war lay in the history of interaction between the ethno-regional groups; rise of ethnic self-consciousness; weakening of the state structure; economic breakdown; lack of political accommodation of the ethno-regional groups and disinterest towards coalition-building undermined the prospects of ethnic rapprochement; partisan and propagandist media; government policies of persecution of members of opposition party; forged elections; political parties were organized along ethno-regional lines; role of external actors and lack of or delayed international response to internal crises of Tajikistan.
The involvement of external actors (Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan etc.) in Tajik crisis was particularly due to atypical geopolitical location of Tajikistan that provided diverse interest ranging from gateway to Central Asian energy and mineral resources; to continue dominance by restricting the influence of rival nations; and to check terrorism, pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, drugs and arms trafficking. The assistance came in the form of active and passive moral and financial support; and military hardware and personnel.
In 1992, the Kulyabi government under Imomali Rahmon was instituted with the support of Russia and Uzbekistan, thus, the Sogdians lost their power position in their region. Soon after coming to power, the Kulyabis started to severely persecute the members of the opposition that led to their departure to Iran, Russia, Afghanistan and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The opposition initially received assistance from Iran. With the outset of the civil war, the assistance was provided on both sides by mercenaries from Russia, Uzbekistan, Baltic States, Caucasus, Afghan Mujahids, Arab instructors as well as significant number of criminal elements released from the jails of the RT who took part in the internal war.
In an ethnic conflict, the democratic-Islamist opposition was not only able to maneuver its political position within Tajikistan but it was also able to secure recognition by the international community. The IRPT led the opposition in the negotiation process during the civil war. It was thus able to enhance not only its international status but also got international assistance.
The Tajik crisis was first time brought to the notice of Security Council on October 30, 1992 through the efforts by Uzbekistan government. Subsequently, the United Nations Secretary General, as part of his peacekeeping initiatives and in close consultation with the Security Council, sent to Tajikistan a small integrated United Nations unit of political, military and humanitarian officers to monitor the situation on the ground, provided liaison services and constitute a ground core for any possible more extensive United Nations participation in the regional efforts in Tajikistan in the future. The Units became operational on 21st January 1993.
Five years of civil war in Tajikistan formally came to an end after vigorous national and international initiatives and the changing national and international environment. The peace talks were sponsored by the United Nations and supported by Contact Group of Guarantor States (Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Peacekeeping Forces).
In late 1996, Taliban established its authority in Afghanistan. The Afghan Mujahideens, who were supporting the Tajik opposition forces, lost their control in Kabul and parts of northern Afghanistan. Iran, another supporter of the opposition, also wanted an early solution to the prolonged civil war. Iran was also concerned about the growing relations between the members of IRPT and Pakistan and the rise of Taliban forces on its eastern border. In the meantime, Iran developed strategic relations with Russia. The common interests were noted at many bilateral meetings of the senior leaders from the two countries. For example, the leaders of Iran and Russia showed their common interests in the meeting held in Tehran on March 6, 1994.
Russia was also losing its hold over Uzbekistan, another important regional player, due to Uzbekistan’s efforts to get out of the Russian hegemony and its subsequent tilt towards the Unites States of America. The prevailing fragile situation was providing an opportunity to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces to become proactive in the region, much against the interests of Russia and Iran.
Russia had two options to face the challenge of Islamic guerrilla fighters firstly, by increasing the forces on the borders and secondly, to start a political dialogue between the warring sides. According to Lena Jonson, when the Taliban movement, composed of Pashtuns, took control of Kabul in September 1996, Moscow at first feared that its members would develop close relations with the Tajik opposition. Some Russian politicians including General Lebed, at that time Secretary of the Russian Security Council, advocated that Russia should provide active support to the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan in order to meet the threat posed in the south. According to Lebed, ‘the route to Bukhara lay wide open to a Taliban offensive which could also threaten the Russian city of Orenburg. The cities of Orenburg, Chelyabinsk and Omsk near Kazakhstan today constitute the axis of Russia’s new state border’.
Internally, Tajikistan was facing acute social, economic and security crisis. In addition, during his visit to Khujand in April 1997, where there was tense situation arising between the Kulyabis and the Khojandis, Tajik President Imomali Rahmon narrowly escaped an attack on his life. The leaders realized that the economic instability and security and political crisis in Tajikistan was pushing the country into Afghan style anarchy.
The formal peace in Tajikistan was established after eight rounds of talks that were held in Moscow (5-15 April 1993); Tehran (18 – 25 June 1994) (Also on 12-17 September a consultative meeting of the delegations of both sides, which established a Joint Committee for Observing the Agreement on Ceasefire took place in Tehran; Islamabad (20 October – 1 November 1994); Almaty (22 May –1 June 1995); Aashkhabad (3-24 November 1995, 26 January - 18 February, 8 - 21 July 1996); Mashhad and Tehran (5 January –19 February 1997); Moscow (26 February - 9 March 1997); Tehran (9 April - 28 May). In addition, six meetings and three rounds of consultations between the Government of Tajikistan and UTO were held.
The reconciliation process led to signing of the “General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan” in Moscow on 27 June 1997, better known as General Agreement. It was ‘gist’ of nine documents that were signed in the course of eight rounds of negotiations between the delegations of the government of Tajikistan and the UTO. The main part included: Protocol on main principles of establishment of peace and national accord in the RT dated 17August 1995; Protocol on political issues dated 18 May 1997; Agreement of the President of the RT and the UTO Leader on the outcomes of Moscow meeting dated 23 December 1996; Protocol “On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 23 December 1996; Provision “On the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 21 February 1997; Additional Protocol to Protocol “On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee” dated 21 February 1997; Protocol on military issues dated 8 March 1997; Protocol on the refugees’ issues dated 13 January 1997; Protocol on the guarantees of the implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan dated 28 May 1997.
The signing ceremony was attended by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group of Guarantor States, Secretary General Azeddine Laraki of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and senior officials of the OSCE, Under Secretary General for Peace Keeping Operations, Bernard Miyet and United Nations Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Merrem. The government of Uzbekistan gave its assent in New York on 26 August 1997. Together the CG and organizations monitored the implementation of the General Agreement by providing expertise, advice, good office, and recommendations on ways to ensure the parties’ compliance with the General Agreement.
With the signing of the peace agreement, Tajikistan saw a new phase of nation-building process (1997-2000) that was based on national reconciliation established by the government and the opposition.
Main mechanism for the implementation of the General Agreement was National Reconciliation Committee (NCR), which consisted of 26 members divided equally between the Government and UTO. The Sayeed Abullo Nuri, UTO Leader became the Chairman of NRC, and Abdulmajid Dostiev, Deputy Speaker of Majlisi Oli, acted as the Deputy Chairman of NCR. The NRC consisted of four sub-committees: on military, political, juridical and refugee issues, in which 3 people from both the government and the UTO were represented.
Under the leadership of Said Abdullo Nuri, NCR was inaugurated in July 1997 and on September 15, 1997 its mandate went into full effect. Initially, there were serious efforts by both the government and the opposition to assist NCR to achieve its objectives. The commission along with the president was intended to oversee the implementation of General Agreement. The work of the Commission was to be conducted in close cooperation with the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan and the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan. The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan was to render advisory assistance. Decision on the Commission on issues related to the activity of the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan was to be taken in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The General Agreement specified a transition period of twelve to eighteen months during which all the protocols of the agreement were to be implemented.
During the transition period, the following provisions were to be implemented:
1. 30 percent UTO representation in government executive structures: - It was never implemented. Nuri was criticized for putting forward a lenient stand and for compromising with the Tajik government over several principles under the agreement that were to be implemented as agreed. This resulted in the nominal status of the opposition in the politics of Tajikistan. Presently, the local Tajik population is not aware of the opposition political parties. In addition, the controlled media both print and electronic had made the people completely ignorant about the leader of the parties. In fact, the general public hardly knows about the existence of opposition parties. As a matter of fact, for a common man self-sustenance is a major concern than Tajik politics.
2. Voluntary and safe return of all refugees and internally displaced people: - During the repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan a volatile situation developed as the refugees were trapped due to Taliban advances in northern Afghanistan around Sakhi near Mazar-e-Sharif in September-October 1997. In the beginning Uzbekistan closed Termez pass and Afghan-Uzbek border but due to international pressure the refugees were repatriated via Uzbekistan. In 2000, Tajik government refused the entry of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan claiming that the presence of armed combatants among the refugees posed security risk to Tajikistan and that country lacked necessary economic and infrastructural resources to accommodate them. It resulted in mass human trafficking of Tajiks to Middle East and CIS countries.
3. Disbanding, disarming and reintegration of opposition forces into government power structures: - Despite the UTO fighters enrolled in the regular Tajik army, the question on reform of the power structures and the distribution of the UTO personnel among them is still contested. The demobilized fighters had no alternative to their livelihood as there were / are no jobs in the public and private sectors. Creating jobs and training them in some vocational courses was another concern for the government. Those who joined the services complained of lack of food and equipments, inadequate accommodation, non-payment of salaries, no proper instructions, training or visit from their superior headquarters, and many of the ex-UTO fighters faced isolation and humiliation. In fact, some of the armed fighters are still loyal to their former military commanders.
In Qarategin Valley there are still non-reintegrated armed groups of former UTO who pose security threat in the region. These groups are practically independent with their respective area of influence and are involved in banditry and hostage taking. Though government has at times used offensive methods to control the activities of these groups, it has only got limited success to reintegrate them into the government structure or civilian life.
4. Reform of government structures: - On 3 December 1998, President Rahmon and Said Nuri reached an agreement that the Assembly of Representatives (Lower House) would comprise of 63 seats and the National Assembly (upper house) 33 seats. It was also decided that the local elections would be conducted simultaneously with the election to the Assembly of Representatives. On 10 December 1998, the new electoral law was adopted by the parliament. The first Presidential elections were scheduled for November 1998.
5. Constitutional Amendments; amendments to the law on elections, the law on political parties and movements, and the law on mass media allowing the functioning of free and objective mass media; The UN established a working group and on the eve of the presidential elections followed by signing of 22-point protocol by Tajik President and Nuri on political guarantees for the participation and conduct of the elections to the parliament. In May 1998, the CNR amended a bill on political parties whereby political parties based on religion were to be banned thus making the functioning of the IRPT unlawful. Nuri emphasized that it was incompatible with the principles of General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. He met President Rahmon that led to the establishment of a 12 member Conciliation Commission comprising of representatives of the government, CNR and the parliament assisted by UNMOT to review the controversial article of the draft law and submit the proposal by June 1997. The commission was funded by the Aga Khan Foundation. The commission reached a consensus to prohibit the use of religious institutions for political purposes. Finally, on 13 August the Supreme Court of Tajikistan lifted the ban on UTO political parties, namely, the IRPT, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Lal-i Badakshan Movement, and the Rastokhez Movement. On 18 September 1998, the IRPT held its first congress since 1993. Delegates amended the Party’s charter, bringing it in line with the requirements of the new Law on Political Parties as revised in November 1998. According to the new law on presidential elections, the nominees were required to submit the signatures of 5 percent of the electorate, namely 145,000 individuals, to register as candidates with the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda (CCER). Only President Rahmon could collect the necessary signatures. The other three candidates i.e. Turayev, Kuvvat and Usmon could not secure the necessary signatures. They complained about being prevented from doing so by intimidation and obstruction at the local level. The Ministry of Justice subsequently re-registered the party allowing it to participate fully in all political activities. In addition, the opposition parties were made non-functional due to charges on its members for violation of the Law on Political Parties. In this regard, the Agrarian Party and the National Unity Party were banned, Party of Justice and Progress (PJP) and National Movement Party of Tajikistan (NMPT) were denied registrations, and the activities of Party of Economic and Political Revival of Tajikistan were suspended. The local government administrators who refused to join the PDPT were demoted or were removed from their positions. Finally four candidates filled their names for the post of the president. Imomali Rahmon from Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), Saifiddin Turayev from Party of Justice of Tajikistan, Sulton Kuvvat from Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and Davlat Usmon from IRPT filed for their nomination. The IRPT wanted its Deputy Leader, Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, to be its candidate but instead Turajonzoda urged the party to support Rahmon. It led to Turajonzoda’s exclusion from IRPT.
Finally in 1999 the first presidential elections took place. Owing to widespread allegations of infringement of democratic norms of elections, the OSCE refused to send observers to monitor the elections. The elections took place where Rahmon won the elections with thumping majority.
The practice of making the opposition parties non-functional continued. According to Shokirjon Khakimov, Deputy Leader of Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan, “We had to struggle for three years to get our party registered for legitimacy. We wrote to different national and international organizations that we cannot constitute our party as the party is not registered. During the elections all the parties were prohibited from contesting the elections and new opposition parties were created which were actually the supporters of the Rahmon’s PDPT. The new parties created were the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan and the Economic and Political Party of Tajikistan. This was done to present to the international community that the elections in Tajikistan were democratic and based on multi-party system.” The Presidential elections were followed by the parliamentary elections in 2000.
MEDIA: - On 7 September 1999 the IRPT newspaper, Najot, was published legally for the first time since the 1993 ban. The media is controlled by the government, both written and television, there are no analytical programs that discusses about the problems of the nation. There are no discussions amongst the parties to resolve problems. The government is not interested in developing political culture. The government controls television programmes, including films, concerts and some plays that do not reflect the current problems of the society. The newspapers only write about the President and his family, culture and cultural events, sports, investments and some other news but no news is analytical that does critical evaluation of the government and the deteriorating economic, social and administrative situation of the country. This is done to keep people away from thinking and analyzing the deteriorating political and economic situation of the nation. Just to keep the press working, such journalists are employed who are not qualified and hardly understand their responsibilities as journalists. They become journalist to earn money.
The last constitutional referendum was held in June 2003 whereby Tajik government initiated a 56th amendment by constitutional referendum. The Article 67 of the 56th amendment permits the incumbent president to have two terms in office thus confirming Rahmon leadership of Tajikistan till 2020 if he is able to win the next presidential election, to be held in 2013. The amendment did not include the current term of the president. The amendment produced some irritants in the political climate of Tajikistan.
6. Full exchange of prisoners of war and other forcibly detained people and Adoption of an Amnesty Law and an Act on Mutual Forgiveness: - In 1998, under the general amnesty, UTO submitted a list of 5,377 former combatants who were to be pardoned as part of their integration into state and military structure. The arbitrary arrests and detention of the UTO fighters remains serious problems since the establishment of formal peace. Some of the important ex-UTO leaders under arrest are Abdulmalik Abdullojonov, former Prime Minister of Tajikistan and former leader of National Revival Movement (NRM) that drew its support from the Sogdh province, his brother Abdulghani Abdullojonov, the former mayor of Khujand, Narzullo Dustov, former Vice President, Abdujalil Hamidov, a relative of Abdulmalik Abdullajonov, Hamidov’s other brother Abdulkhafiz Abdullaev was sentenced to death for attempt to assassination on the President in 1997; Yakub Salimov, a former Popular Front commander, was arrested in Russia and sent to Tajikistan. He was sentenced to 15 years in 2004. Rustam Fayziev, deputy chairman of the unregistered Party of Progress was sentenced to five years; Nizomiddin Begmatov, Chairman of Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan was sentenced to one and a half years; and Qosim Rakhimov of IRPT remained in prison after the 2004 judgment. Dovud and Sherali Nazriec were sentenced to death in May 2001 for attempting to assassinate Makhmadsaid Ubaydullayev, mayor of Dushanbe in February 2000. The most controversial arrest was of Muhammadruzi Iskandarov, a prominent field commander of UTO during the civil war and head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan since 1999 was sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2005. It is said that Tajikistan traded with Russia. In return of Iskandarov, Russia got the imperialist rights particularly over Nurek in Tajikistan. Serious doubts were raised on the fairness of all the trial.
7. Establishment of a Central Electoral Commission for conducting elections and referenda, with 25 percent UTO representation in its composition: - The Central Commission on Elections and Referenda consists of a Chairman, Deputy Chairman and 13 members. The appointment of election commissions failed to ensure multi-party composition and a neutral election administration.
“Despite the inadequacies in the electoral law, no provision was made for independent domestic observers, while the party observers could raise questions only with the approval of the election commission chairman; no deadline was set for the withdrawal of a candidacy, leaving room for pressure on candidates to withdraw at the last minute; and the provisions for equal access to the media were not sufficiently specific”. In addition, the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda (CCER) had not issued regulations on the implementations of the electoral law, and no written instructions had been given to the lower election commissions.
The election control board does not make necessary arrangements for the opposition to propagate their party ideology or organize general public meetings. According to Shokirjon Khakimov, “The democratic form of government does not exist in Tajikistan. Technically, Tajikistan is democratic and independent but practically, the opposition is not independent. The position and working of the opposition is guided by the government through the commands given to them and the concerned authorities on phone by the president. For example, the PDPT tried to prohibit the Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) by making it illegal by orders passed by the Supreme Court that was guided by the PDPT. This was done to prohibit the SDPT from contesting the elections.”
8. Setting the date for new parliamentary elections: - the date for presidential and parliamentary elections was set for 1999 and 2000 respectively. The elections were held under UN and OSCE supervision. Huge electoral frauds were reported.
Despite of all the shortcomings the final conditions of the 1997 peace agreement were concluded. The opposition formed a new alliance, For the Promotion of Democracy, which abstained from contesting the legislative elections of February and March 2000 after the dissolution of the CNR. The elections took place in a completely uneasy social and political environment. In addition, there was inherent lack of confidence between the parties. The JEOM pointed out that the elections did not meet the minimum standards. “It listed weaknesses in the legislation, which failed, among other things, to ensure the independence of the election administration commission, and the minimum level of transparency during voter registration, printing of ballots, tabulation, announcement, and publication of the results. On the polling day, there was a high rate of proxy voting in more than 68 per cent of the precincts observed and voters were allowed to cast ballots without proper identification documents in 67 per cent of those precincts.”
In November 2003, the Socialist Democratic Party organized Coalition for Fair and Transparent Elections. The IRPT and the Democratic Party joined the coalition in calling for a revamp the national election law. The OSCE and UN advocated electoral reforms. In July 2004, the president signed a new election law. The amended law has drawn criticism from international community as it introduces US $500 as registration fee for each election candidate thus preventing the opposition politicians from running the forthcoming parliamentary elections of February 2005.
Although the November 2006 Presidential elections were peaceful, OSCE/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted that “The 6 November 2006 presidential elections in the Republic of Tajikistan did not fully test democratic electoral practices as outlined in the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, due to a lack of genuine choice and meaningful pluralism, and revealed substantial shortcomings. Despite the presence of five candidates and some administrative improvements, the 6 November 2006 presidential election was characterized by a marked absence of competition. Parties that determined themselves as political opposition to the incumbent chose not to nominate candidates. As a result, voters were presented with a choice that was only nominal.”
Apart from this there are numerous efforts taken by the international community to establish a dialogue between the government and the opposition. The Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD) is a child of the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force. The Dialogue was designed with a dual agenda: to discuss specific problems at length and to increase understanding of the dynamics in the relationships that cause the problems. Patterns of interaction were changed through working together in sustained dialogue. ITD consisted of 14 prominent citizens of Tajikistan divided among different political factions where 3 Russians and 3 Americans forms the third party and co-chaired the meetings alternatively.
In March 2000, ITD members formed a Non Governmental Organization (NGO) known as Public Committee for Democratic Process (PCDP) along with Tajik Peace Building Initiative, after the completion of series of elections. The task was to establish network of regional dialogues inside Tajikistan to vent out grievances within elites, develop an educational program in collaboration with the Ministry of Education of Tajikistan due to deteriorating standards, and formation of a regional economic development committee for community-based process around local economic development issues.
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The foremost task is of nation-building and of developing a democratic political culture. The rebuilding of Tajikistan requires national and international efforts to undertake projects dealing with structural reforms, economic development, and improvement of demographic situation.
However solution of urgent issues are exacerbated by endemic corruption in country; Tajik political institutions are centralized; the president and his administration control the decision-making process with complete control over the legislative and judicial bodies; unemployed ex-combatants; lack of transparency; media is controlled; opposition parties are totally marginalized; and economic recession has effected employment, investment, and corporate profits. In addition, security concerns due to long and unguarded borders with Afghanistan keep the stability in Tajikistan uncertain.
The illegal drug trade is flourishing. It is undermining Tajikistan's social, moral and legal fabric by pushing its youth into criminal activities and interfering in its governing and judicial bodies. Tajikistan is a major conduit for narcotics produced in Afghanistan. The drug trade led to drug addiction among the youth. These young people need to be provided with jobs and drug rehabilitation facilities as they can be a source of major trouble, including being recruits for Islamic militant groups in the future. At a meeting of the Shanghai Five (Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) in June 2001, all leaders, plus the Uzbek president, adopted a framework for cooperation in battling Islamic insurgency.
The most prominent political party is President’s party, i.e., Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan. The two other parties with some support base are the Communist Party and the IRP. The Democratic Party is split into many factions, and many of its leading figures are now in government. The Tajik government is able to maintain authoritarian rule because the Tajik opposition parties are regionally based, divided, unorganized, lack resources and remains unpopular amongst Tajik citizens due to government control over media and limited opportunities for them to propagate their policy. As one IRP senior official mentioned that "It is easier to fund the kalashnikov than to support political and social platforms." In addition, the present leadership is successful in crediting itself for bringing peace in the region and has tainted the opposition for being responsible for the civil war. In fact, opposition to the government is often referred to as a derogatory term in Tajik society. It is because the country has recently witnessed a civil war and majority of population fear that any opposition might push them into another major crisis. Therefore at present opposition may not be in a position to secure support to their policies. In addition, the role of Russia behind “king maker” can not be overlooked.
According to official statistics, the economy is on the road to recovery. Yet Tajikistan still remains the poorest country in the CIS with the lowest income per capita. In late January 2008, the government disclosed that the national debt stood at a whopping $1.2 billion, a figure that is almost one-third of the country's GDP. Most alarming for the country's creditors, the government's 2008 budget allocates a mere $44.2 million for debt repayment.
The question is to which state will Rahmon approach to bail out Tajikistan from economic crisis- Russia, China or the West including United States of America? Russia has the largest investments in strategic economic concerns in Tajikistan. Most of the Tajik immigrant workers are presently working in Russia. Tajik relations with Russia have soured since late last summer, when Dushanbe summarily cancelled a contract with the Russian conglomerate RusAl to finish construction on the Rogun dam. In addition, Russia’s policies towards immigrants have put Tajiks doubt Russia’s solemn concern towards Tajikistan. Russia’s pro-Uzbekistan tilt has further made Tajiks feel alienated.
Tajikistan's two biggest creditors are China and Uzbekistan, which are owed $217 million and $63.6 million respectively. China is actively and aggressively involved in diverse projects in Tajikistan including construction and exporting commodities. A large number of Chinese offices have recently opened in Tajikistan. Consequently, Tajiks have been showing interests in sending their children to China for learning Chinese language. The knowledge of Chinese language may provide them better job opportunities. The International Monitory Fund report of March 2007 noted that the total loans provided by China are "Although concessional in nature (with grant of 40 percent), the disbursement of these loans will lead to a rapid reaccumulation of debt."
Thus, prevailing conditions could open a window for the United States and western nations to revive an ambitious plan to marginalize Chinese presence and Russia influence in the region. It can be done by linking Central Asia's power grid to South Asia. Under the American-backed blueprint, first aired in the spring of 2006 by the State Department, infrastructure investment in Tajikistan would unlock the country's vast potential to generate hydro-power. Tajikistan's surpluses could then be exported to South Asian nations, especially Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The possible reorientation of Central Asia's power grid would deal a substantial blow to Russia's geopolitical influence in the region. Although, Tajik president is providing opportunities to Western nations of getting involved in Tajikistan, common Tajiks do not trust the western nations for two reasons, firstly, the Soviet legacy when anti-American and western sentiments were too strong and secondly, the recent colour revolutions in Central Asian republics keep their mistrust strapping.
Conclusion
In the new transition phase, the following are priority tasks:- Political accommodation with regional and opposition representation in decision making, Development of democratic self-governing institutions, Political parties to have national outlook and not regionally biased; Opportunity to be provided to develop democratic political culture where political parties and people have opportunities to exercise their rights; Develop free and independent media; Expand and involve the local Non Governmental Organizations in strategic planning; Check corruption at the top level; Not to overindulge in religious laws; and Concept of Checks and balance should be adopted. There is no doubt that a strong centre and state is required for nation-building. But denying political accommodation to the opposition in the strongly fragmented Tajik society is likely to increase group resistance up to some verge beyond which extreme forces might adopt further and more violent opposition.
