Russia and Central Asian Security

Abstract

Russian economic, cultural and historical relations with Central Asia are older than the birth of the Soviet power in 1917. According to the Russian Orientalist Lev Gumilev, "Already by the end of 12th century one could visualize Russia and the great steppe, region as a single ethnographic space." [i]

The Central Asian region gained importance due to unprecedented resources that made the region a raw material appendage for the Russian manufacturing industries in the 20 th century. According to the western political scientists, the Soviet Union pursued colonial and exploitative policies in Central Asia. It also followed the traditional imperialist approach of divide and rule where the Russians acted as a catalyst. However Venyukov, while mentioning about the Cossacks, who for long time had been marrying the daughters of the Caucasian mountaineers said that, "We are not Englishmen, who in India do their utmost to avoid mingling with the native. Our strength, on the contrary lies in the fact that up to the present times we have assimilated subject race, mingling affable with them." [ii]

Devendra Kaushik noted that "when the disintegration of Soviet Union took place in December 1991 it was due to the urge of the pro-West democratic Russian elites to offload the burdensome Central Asian Republics in order to achieve a speedy modernization than the secessionist desire of the Central Asian ruling elite." [iii]

The first effort to reintegrate Russia and Central Asia came in the form of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), initially a 'lose alliance' between three Slavic nations formed on December 8, 1991 at Minsk. Finally, the Almaty Summit meeting provided the base for the evolution of regional organization based on issues concerning 'Eurasian space'. For instance its Article 7 deals with joint initiatives in foreign policy, creation of common economic space, transport, communication system, environmental protection, migration policy and suppression of organized crime. [iv] Amongst other things, the CIS can be said was initiated also to prevent West from gaining foothold in the region.

Owing to the civil war in Tajikistan, in 1993, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were created, wherein Russia shared maximum burden. At military level, the CIS failed to achieve desired results as during the civil war in Tajikistan, Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan failed to provide troops in symbolic form. It was only after the emergence of Taliban that the CIS members took active interest in countering the threat posed on the security of CIS states. It may be noted that earlier the six CIS states namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and Georgia formed Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent in 1992. It prohibited the member states from taking a joint action (with any other group of sates) against CST signatory.

In spite one of the founders of CST, in April 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew itself from the body and joined the US supported organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM) to get out of the Russian hegemony. However, GUUAM suffered from stagnated development. It was only after the series of revolution in some member states made many analysts speculate on the possible revival of GUUAM. However, in 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM following the persecution of Islamists in Andijon incidence as well as the Kazakhstan presidents' visit to Tashkent. Uzbekistan rejoined Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006.

Earlier at Minsk Summit in 2000, CST adopted a number of documents for strengthening security of the region. The most important among them was 'a memorandum of increasing the effectiveness of the CST and its ability to adapt to the present day geopolitical situation and a model for a regional collective security system'. In fact the 9/11 terrorist attack altered the regional security situation in Eurasia to a greater extent. Consequently the CSTO was formed by the remaining CST members in September 2002. The formation of CSTO was speculated to have been initiated to prevent NATOs military presence in the region under the garb of anti-terrorist campaign and its policy of eastward expansion that led to the development of NATOs Partnership for Peace program. In addition, the US transnational project (TRACECA) called for establishing a transport corridor (mainly for oil) between Europe and the Caucasian Asia. According to S.D.Muni, "Russia seemed to have mixed position on this. While ideally, Russia would prefer the US to stay away from the region in its strategic proximity there are indications that the US military presence in the region enjoys Russian approval, at least willing acquiescence, without which this presence could not be stable. This dual posture seems to have been governed by the larger Russian interest in the economic and strategic cooperation with the US and immediate interests of containing Islamic extremism, especially in Chechnya and around its strategic soft belly in Central Asia." [v]

Francois Heisbourge, noted that "President Vladimir Putin has clearly taken a real political risk in helping open the door of Central Asia to the US. Americans as the authors of Monroe Doctrine should have little trouble understanding that Moscow's cooperation was important in securing ready physical and durable political access to the states of Central Asia." [vi] Russian media has described this military presence as 'putting a color on the Yellow Dragon'. [vii]

The post 9/11 also saw Russian political elites taking keen interest in reintegrating the post-Soviet space. Addressing the journalist at the sideline of the 10 th anniversary of the CST held in May 2002, Vladimir Putin emphasized that the "Collective Security Treaty signatories are now establishing new organization have 'joined hands not against any third parties but threats they are facing'". He also said that "all actions by the anti-terrorist coalitions should be 'coordinated within the United Nations Security Council'". [viii]

Like CIS, another important institutional mechanism which emerged in an informal way is Shanghai Five, later renamed as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the admission of Uzbekistan in June 2001. The SCO has also created a Special Coordinating Body in April 2002, which brings the Russian and Chinese defence efforts in the region closer to each other. Like the CSTO, the SCO states demonstrated their capability to coordinate their fight against terrorist forces and transnational criminals, conducted their first ever military exercise known as 'Coalition 2003' in August 2003 in which all members except Uzbekistan participated. It may be noted that despite contradictions within CIS and SCO these states have been taking some initiatives to realize the goal of Eurasian integration. It is important to note that initially SCO was not an exclusive organization and was open to all and was not directed against anyone. Essentially, it is a better regional organization.

It is interesting to note that despite differences among the states of Eurasia, one issue, which unites all these states, is the issue of external observation of election in the CIS states. The observers of OSCE always criticize all the presidential and parliamentary elections as unfair and cite use of dubious means by elected candidates. On the other hand the observers of CIS states justify the elections as fair. Taking a strong exception to the OSCEs perception on the election in the post-Soviet space on July 3, 2004 after the 'rose revolution in Georgia, the presidents of Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan criticized the election observation process of the OSCE and some other western NGOs.

Not only at political level but also at economic level, the CIS members took active interest in promoting regional cooperation like in the initial years single economic zone was created, Economic Union Treaty was signed to provide impetus to Free Trade and also to create a 'customs union with reduced internal tariffs and common external tariffs', free trade zone and customs and settlement union.

The present paper also takes a critical look at the post-Soviet period with regard to the trade balance between Russia and Central Asia that has been predominantly in Russia 's favor, largely because Russian exports to the region have been mainly finished products with high added value, while exports from Central Asia to Russia have mainly been raw material. This should not be viewed as neo-imperialism but post imperialism as Russia is well aware of the fact that it can not survive on the basis of imperialist policies. Russia has hardly any economic clout and is not ideologically sound enough to practice neo-imperialism. This post-imperialism is referred to as by Devendra Kaushik as 'soft power' due to Russia's economic consolidation, foreign exchange increase of Russia because of oil and gas, and increase in trade and investment by Russia in Central Asia. In addition, Russian language opens door for greater economic opportunities which should not be taken as neo-imperialism but as post imperialism and a thing to be welcomed. It is important for Central Asia to adopt Nehruvian approach that aims for widening area of peace and reducing area of war that arises due to competitive organizations within region.