Mansi Mehrotra - Khanna

Causes for the Civil War in Tajikistan

2011-07-05T14:27:00.003+05:30

Mansi Mehrotra-Khanna

Twentieth century witnessed a two phased decolonization process one after the end of Second World War in the mid twentieth century and second after the end of Cold War in 1990s. Occurrence of ethnic war, after the departure of colonial power, has become a customary norm for the third world countries that was repeated in both the phases. Tajikistan is no exception.

In trying to explain why ethnic definitions of identity are stronger in some times and place than in others, has been argued that such identities are rendered salient by such socio-historical process as industrialization and modernization. The Cold War period sidelined the ethnic self-identification, which erupted immediately after its end. As after First World War the concept of self-identification formed the strong ground in the formation of states based on Wilsonian principles (Gellner 1983).

Tajikistan attained its sovereign status on September 8, 1991, after the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR or the Soviet Union). It was for the first time in the history of Tajikistan that it became a self-governing unit. Immediately following independence, Tajikistan came under intense civil unrest caused due to domestic and international factors that delineate the fragile social, political and economic state of affairs.

The dress rehearsal of the civil war started in May 1989 with the rumor about the arrival of Armenians who were to be housed in the new homes. In addition, the Armenians were also attacked in Azerbaijan. Tajikistan itself was trying to cope with the natural calamity it has been suffering due to a massive earthquake that hit Dushanbe suburbs leaving thousands of people homeless in Hissar district on January 23, 1989. Sharara village of the district was buried under a 17 meter landslide. All 600 inhabitans of Sharara died. An earlier quake hit Armenia killing an estimated 25000 people. Moscow was trying to accommodate thousands of Armenian homeless throughout the Soviet Union. Thus, the Armenian refugees were intruding the rights of the native inhabitants who had been waiting for their turn

The shortage of bread and a complete standstill of city transport made the situation in Dushanbe more complicated as the cities inhabitants had to go home on foot. Along the streets they ran into hooligans and threw stones at the law enforcement bodies. In addition fighters from rayon’s were clashing in the city. Self-defence groups, consisting of workers and soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan, were assisting the law enforcement bodies that were taking measures to prevent mass disturbances. Many people claimed that Ministry of Internal Affairs’ workers knew of the impending attack on the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee building but despite that they did not take effective measures. They were even blamed for being involved in collaborating in kidnapping and were aware of the so-called “informal prisons”.

Subsequently, a few days before the elections, Dushanbe witnessed conflict, pogroms, excesses and robberies from 11-14 February 1990. Dodadzhon Ismailov, head of the Tajik State University said that, “The Tajik people have always been known for their friendliness and hospitality. It is impossible to believe that the arrival of a few refugees from the Caucasus could cause such a stormy reaction.” He further maintained that “there were organizers behind crowd and its actions are being directed by someone. There is no doubt that these people want to force their way into power this way. As there was no coincidence that such events developed precisely on the eve of the republic’s Supreme Soviet elections. That would hinder the electoral process. Such justifications were supported by D.Karimov, the then First Secretary of the City Party Committee, who admitted that an year ago the city’s inhabitant welcomed cordially and with traditional hospitality the refugees from the earthquake regions in Armenia and gave them temporary shelters”.

In another report, the Armenians who returned from Dushanbe told at the Zvartnots airport that the events of Tajikistan followed the same notorious scenario as Sumgait and Baku. The refugees explained that the Tajik people have always been friendly towards the Armenians, and in these grave days many of them defended and protected the Armenians and expressed their indignation at the extremists’ actions. The report noted that earlier representatives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front arrived in Tajikistan to provoke anti-Armenian sentiments. They distributed large amounts of money and drugs, specifically to young people, and instigated them to expel all foreigners (first the Armenians) topple the local authorities and create an Islamic state.

Yaacov Ro’i quotes “Behind the rioting had stood forces who had sought to use the peaceful multitude in order to take power into their own hands. ‘Corrupt and criminal elements’ had worked in unison with a group of nationally oriented leaders (liferov) and people who speculated on the religious feelings of believers. Unquestionably, the anti-socialist, religious-extremist and nationalist moods were a danger for Tadzhik society. And the situation was made even more complicated by the subversive activities of the armed Afghan opposition that endeavored ‘at the behest of the adversary (protivnik)’s special organs to instigate hostile manifestations among the [Soviet] population.

The root cause of ethnic conflict of Tajikistan can be traced in both internal and external factors. On 28 April 1992, Afghanistan fell to the mujahideen and within a few days on 5 May 1992, the first shots were fired in Tajikistan that marked the beginning of the civil war. The members of the presidents’ guards open fired near the village of Leninskiy and Yavan, 20km east from Dushanbe, at the local citizens’ picket who were hindering to presidents’ supporters trip from Kulyab to Dushanbe. This led to casualties. In reaction the opposition took control of presidential palace and the local television centre and appealed to stop bloodshed and reestablish peace and relayed the videotapes of shooting in Lenenskyi and Yavan districts on the national television. Soon the skirmish spread to Dushanbe and there were regular reports of shooting in the capital. It was reported that Nabiev and Kendzhayev took refuge in the National Security Committee building. Opposition blamed the government presidents’ guards for carrying out terrorist acts where the people dressed in militia and military uniform were driving around in the city in the ambulance. Overnight armored vehicle arrived in Dushanbe.

The domestic causes for the civil war can be studied under the following headings: -

History of interaction between ethno-regional groupings

The ethnic history, to a great extent, depends upon the topography of the country. Tajikistan, being located at a high altitude with harsh mountain terrain discouraged the intermingling of the people. It has four natural divisions i.e. Sogdh region, Qarategin and Gissar Valley, Khatlon and the Gorno Badakshan Autonomous Oblast, separated by high mountains that make the commuting from one region to another quite difficult. This has led to the development of distinct ethnicity of each region. In addition, the uneven distribution of population and resources has also discouraged the people from mixing with one another. Politically, economically and socially regionalism or what Tajiks called mahalgeria deprived the country to establish a strong Tajik identity.

The marriage pattern in the Tajik society reflects some of the realities where people prefer to marry within clan. The Ismailis do not marry outside their community because they not only practiced different religious beliefs but also speak different language and the Uzbek girls usually do not marry Tajik boys.

Russians always considered themselves to be belonging to a superior race. Despite of feeling close to Tajiks than to the Russians of Russia due to their upbringing in Tajikistan, their affiliation with Tajikistan was notional and not emotional. People of Gharm and Qarategin valley were more religious. Kyrgyz of northeast i.e. in the Sogdh region and of south east of Badakshan maintained their separate identity. People of Badakshan have a stronger Pamiri identity that overrules common Tajik identity.

Soviet legacy

Every colony inherits good and evils of the erstwhile ruler. There is no doubt that during the Soviet period and particularly under the Russians, Tajikistans society and economy reached its zenith. Most of the present day society, polity and economy have been shaped during the Soviet times. Certain policies pursued by Russians like carving out the boundaries of present day Tajikistan that made Tajiks devoid of its cultural capital’s Samarkand and Bukhara, frequently alteration of demography of Tajikistan and making it ethnically heterogeneous, passing language law and promotion of Russian language education, ethnic separatism in line with the usage of the term national’nost used to categorize the population in terms of their nationality that was supported by Tajik geographical proximity, Moscow supported the political and administrative recruitment based on clan based or tribal considerations, discouraged the creation of nation-state.

Traditionally the elites of Tajikistan were in a habit of receiving orders from Moscow. The policies of Tajikistan related to social, economic, administrative, educational, judicial, executive, etc. were directly controlled by Moscow where Tajiks were only involved in its implementation. This led to a lack of skilled policy making professionals amongst the Tajiks.

In order to maintain control over the region, Russians adopted a policy of divide and rule where Russians themselves acted as balancer. Thus, the process of regionalism was established. The Soviet employed historians and scholars were encouraged to create histories and ethnographies of the Tajik people, that showed them as distinct ethnic group- a version of history that was then disseminated through schools, media and other propaganda channels. A particularly significant figure in this was the Tajik historian Babadzhan Gafurov, who wrote several histories of the “Tajik” that became standard reading in schools from 1960s onwards. This campaign of ethnic “self expression” was, of course, carefully controlled. Forms of Tajik “nationalism” that undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet state, or attempted to develop an alternative model of national identity, were immediately curtailed. And at the same time as encouraging national “self expression”, the state was also promoting during most of the Soviet period a programme of creeping russification: Russian became a compulsory subject on the school curriculum, and Russian became de facto the language of most administrative academic and political life. The policy for the development of the Tajik national identity received a thrust during the Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost when the intellectual elite in Tajikistan rose to assert their Tajik Persian identity above the Soviet Russian identity. There was an instant euphoria amongst the Tajik intelligentsia to relate to their Persian brothers in Iran and Afghanistan and rediscover their glorious Persian past. The cultural organizations soon raised to challenge the political communist conservative to recognize their Persian and Muslim identity above the atheistic Soviet communist policy. These organizations took an extreme form when the communist refused to step down and recognize them as political forces in the country.

Soon after the disintegration of Tajikistan and with the disappearance of the balancer resulted in the staggered nation building process that facilitated the escalation of the ethno-regional tendencies. In addition, political elites were not able to look beyond maximizing their social, political and economic advantages and creating their own secured status rather than finding a roadmap to nation-building process. The feeble economic, social and political structure due to its dependence on Russians; absence of common Tajik national identity; ideological vacuum and inexperience in decision making and handling of state structure amongst the Tajiks; reluctance of regional leaders to compromise with each other; and finally, Tajiks could not come out of their overall dependence on Uzbekistan and Russia this was true for economic, ideological, political and defence facilities were additional reasons to their internal weakness.

In addition to this, according to United Nations Secretary General’s (UNSG) report of August 1993, “The conflict in Tajikistan has also been fueled by an abundance of arms. Large quantities of arms were left by the Soviet forces when they evacuated from Afghanistan through the territory of Tajikistan. In addition, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the southern borders of Tajikistan with Afghanistan (1,387 kilometers in length) became virtually open and porous to arms smuggling”.

It should be noted that the arms were not sold but coming to Tajikistan from different countries particularly from Pakistan via Afghanistan funded by Saudi Arabia, US and Iran.

Rise of Islamic Extremism

In the post-Soviet Tajikistan the Muslim political elite organized themselves under different categories. First were, fundamentalist/ extremists like the Hizb ut-Tahrir who out rightly rejects the democratic values and contemporary western liberal culture. They aspire to establish Islamic law and morality; secondly the traditionalists, which include the mullahs and some members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) who seek to establish a conservative social order. They reject globalization, modernity and any change; third are modernists, some members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan come under this category working towards finding a meeting point between Islam and democracy. Finally, the secularists, under this category come the president’s party (Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan), communists, socialists and democrats. They want to separate religion from the politics of the country. At the same time they have, on occasion used Islam as a means to develop nationalism and external relations with other Islamic nations and thus establishing a united country and being part of Muslim Brotherhood respectively.

These rising tendencies and political aspirations got the support of Afghanistan and clandestinely by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran challenging the secular communist government at the centre. The support had two fold objectives, first was to spread extremist Islam in the region and second was to find a foothold

Social, political and economic dominance of the regional elites

Traditionally the ruling elite came from Khujand region that got the support of Uzbekistan and Russia. Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, a new fragile security environment emerged in the region. The regional elites rebelled and made every effort to benefit from the fragile national and international situation in their favor. The opposition initially did not want the Khojandis to be marginalized as they realized the economic importance of the region. But the Khujandi elites were not ready to share the power with the newly emerging political forces. The incompetence of the Khojandis to keep the opposition in check and the desire to continue exclusive rule made Khojandis invite Uzbekistan and Russia to intervene in the internal affairs. This policy of Tajik President Nabiev is seen by many observers as an important reason for the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan.

Every effort was undertaken to keep the opposition, which drew its support from other regions, away from the power structure like they were not given any important positions in the state structure. Instead stringent measures were taken to keep them from expanding their sphere of influence. When Kulyab government established its control at the centre the Khojandis were marginalized leading to insecurity amongst the Khojandi clan leading to the rise of separatist movements in Khujand.

Regionalism

According to Oliver Roy, “Everywhere you go the cadres are local, and below the level of hâkim or president of the soviet district they were virtually unshiftable. They run things not so much by administrative power as by means of networks and informal meetings. They themselves operate via logic of networks: if they are suspected of favoritism to their own people, they have to move fast to smooth things out with the other groups so as to avoid incidents which might be reported back to the authorities at the centre and compromise their position. Rotation of cadres is a punishment, and therefore temporary”. He further explores that “An initial elite was recruited from among the Pamiris (for instance Shirinshah Shahtimur, born in 1899, who was president of the Soviet from 1933 to 1937). The explanation of this may have been that the Pamiris, being poor, not very religious, looked down on by the Sunni and under Russian domination since the 1870s, had played the Russian card. However, the Pamiris were purged in 1937”. After that the Khojend faction formed the ruling elites. This was because the region being more developed, more Russified and also more ‘Uzbekised’ than the rest of Tajikistan. While the first secretary was always from Leninabad, “the president of the Council of Ministers was a Kulabi from 1985 onwards (Khayayev between 1985-1990) and the president of the Assembly (an honorary position) was a Gharmi from Fayzabad, the Gharmi town closest to the power elites. The war in Afghanistan put the Pamiris back in the saddle, because Moscow was nervous of possible collusion between the Tajiks and the Afghan Mujahediin, and decided to give the Pamiris the MVD and part of the KGB. Thus the only ones to be excluded from power were the Gharmis, and they went on to become politicized under the banner of Islam”.

By the end of 1980s, social and political discontent among the Tajiks increased that led to the development of underground political movements and occasional violent inter-group conflicts over the allocation of state resources. Some movements had taken a xenophobic and nationalistic character and slogans like “Tajikistan for the Tajiks” were used in street demonstrations. These developments contributed to an exodus of ethnic Slave, Germans and Jews, many of whom had skilled professional and whose departure undermined the Tajik industrial, educational and health sector.

The pro-government supporters came from Khujand and Kulyab, where in the Kulyab camp there were two factions i.e. Kulyabi and from Gissari. Tajik authorities, after Sangak Safarov’s death, decided to set up a Tajik army on the basis of the armed units from Kulyab. This alienated the Kulyab faction of their support of Gissar, leading to a new struggle for power between Kulyabis and Gissaries. Despite Mansurov, who was from Gissar, was appointed the new mayor of Dushanbe the mistrust between the two could not be resolved.

The anti-government supporters came from Kurgan-Tyube, Gharm-Qarategin and parts of Badakshan. They had their own regional parties and party members. With the governments repressive policies most of the opposition members were functioning from Afghanistan, Iran, Moscow, Badakshan and Qarategin.

Ethnic self-consciousness

The independence of Tajikistan was not sought after and was not earned out of some internal Tajik revolutionary movement so could not form the basis for the nation state.

There was a sudden spur in the demands by various republics to revive their native language and culture. According to K.Warikoo, “New political parties and activist groups that have been established across Central Asia, are not only promoting the civic, political and religious demands of indigenous peoples, but are also resorting to anti-Russian/Slav stance”. In Tajikistan the initiative was undertaken by the Rastokhez Popular Movement. The movements and nationalist slogans were used in the streets of Tajikistan, especially during the Armenian issue.

The over emphasis on language law and revival of Tajik culture and tradition made the people divert from important point and urgent need to initiate the nation building process and resolve the economic and social problems arising out of the breakdown of the existing administrative structure.

Ethnic elections and selections

When Nabiev was formally elected after the November 1991 elections, the entire ministry was dominated by the former communists from Khojand-Kulyab regions.

At the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand on December 2, 1992, when the new cabinet was introduced, the entire ministry came from the Tajik Communist Party and its members were from Kulyab region with some portfolio allotted to Khojand faction. Soon after the death of Sangak Safarov, the entire ministry was re shuffled and the entire ministry was exclusively made up of the Kulyab clan. The head of all the important institutions or government organization are from Kulyab region or their loyalist. Some of the ministers were reportedly inexperienced and others had criminal records.

The members of the Popular Front militia, with majority members from Kulyab, were reinstated in the Tajik regular army. Consequently, only the Kulyab militia earned an official status but remaining regional mercenaries continued to exist.

Government policies

The policies toward opposition were the main reasons for the continuation of the civil war. Soon after President Rahmon became the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, in Jan 1993, he instituted a judicial proceedings against the leaders of the opposition parties including Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, spiritual head of the Tajik Muslims, Mohammed Sharif Himatzoda of Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Tohir Abdurjabbor of Rastokhez Popular Movements, Atobek of Lali Badakshan and Shodmon Yusuf, leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and former deputy premier Davlat Usmon, deputy chairman of the IRPT. They were accused of entering into a criminal collusion in May 1992 for the purpose of seizing power and overthrowing the lawfully elected leadership of the republic. They were also charged with committing anti-constitutional actions that called for forcible overthrow of lawfully governing body, installing de facto leadership of the republic, creating unlawful armed groups, masterminding combat actions that led to the fratricidal war and caused causalities and damaging the economy of the country. Finally, on the basis of several volumes of evidence, including newspaper clips, photographs and video material the decision was taken against the opposition parties. A few days before the elections of the peoples deputies organized an open hearing in the Supreme Court of Tajikistan under the Tajik Procurator General Makhmadnazar Salikhov’s appeal to suspend the activities of the bloc of opposition socio-political organizations, including the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic Rebirth Party, the Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Lali Badakshan society. In fact, the opposition needed to be recognized and not marginalized in order to solve the conflict. Media control, gross human rights violation and denial of existence of political opposition further aggravated the situation.

The government called the opposition ‘Vofchiks’, a Russian nickname for Vladimir, which was slang used for ‘Wahhabis’. In response, the government side came to be known as ‘Yurchiks’ a nickname for Yuri. International efforts were made to establish peace.

The peace agreement of 1997 made way to the enactment of new constitution that provides safeguards and 30 percent reservations for opposition in the Parliament. Yet there were frequent removals of the opposition members thus discouraging them to be part of political structure. Moreover, they were given an insignificant position in the Ministry. In fact, the concept of representative democracy, political accommodation and compromise is a new ideology.

Weakening of the state structure

Inability of government to have centralized control kept the security situation shaky. Lack of common unifying ideology, constant struggle for power amongst various ethnic groups, use of “unconstitutional means” to maintain their control, and failure of economy led to endemic corruption regarded as the legacy of soviet communist system. Consequently the regional leaders acquired strength and tested their power positions nationally as well as internationally. The weak state made government conform to unconstitutional and brutal means to curb all the opposition and establish its firm control at the centre.

Security dilemma or security threat

The security dilemma was the result of weak state and the change in the power structure. When Safarali Kenjayev became part of the Khujand camp, he targeted the Pamiri minister of the interior, Naujavanov, who had been in the post since 1987. This attack (the reason for which were obscure) soon led to a mobilization among the Pamiris of Dushanbe (originated into the Lal-i Badakshon ‘ruby of Badakshan’) party, who feared that they were again going to be removed from power, 55 years after the purges of 1937. The opposition armed forces called Nijat-i Milli (Front for National Salvation), under Davlat Usman, head of the Front and Shadman Yusuf, chairman of the Democratic Party, was founded in June 1992 after an attack on pro-Nabiev forces in Kulyab. In Dushanbe the opposition armed group called Youth of Tajikistan was led by Mulla Khudaidad Abdul Ghaffur, who was also a member of IRPT and sponsored government in exile in northern Afghanistan. The fighters of the opposition were well trained in the training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan by the professionals against the pro-government not so well trained and motivated armed personnel. The emergence of the opposition forces as a potential security threat led the pro-government demonstrators demanding for weapons near the army check-point in Kulyab. The government increased the border forces to prevent any supply of arms and ammunition entering into the republic from Afghanistan.
Many efforts were made to resolve the differences between the government and the opposition like Khorog Peace Agreement of July 1992. But such agreements could not be implemented due to the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Security Committee, and the Defence Committee, as they were the ones responsible for carrying out the objects of the Khorog agreement. Lack of momentum in the implementation of the decisions taken and the time limit placed for meeting the points of the agreement also led to its failure. The presence of Russian troops was seen with suspicion by the opposition because of their direct involvement in internal armed conflict. Khorog Peace Agreement was an important agreement and the absence of President Nabiev made all side not only worried towards Nabiev’s seriousness towards the peace process but also led opposition to declare a no-confidence in him that called for public support. Nuri in many of his statements said that the Russian border troops were one of the causes of tension. He even criticized the UN for not being able to put pressure on them in order to force them to respect the Tehran agreement and stop cease-fire violations. The opposition even charged the international community and international organizations for undertaking biased position in Tajik crisis. Opposition radio Voice of Free Tajikistan had criticized the UN report by the UN military observers investigating the situation in the Shuroabad section of the border in southern Tajikistan on the grounds that it only covered the territory held by the government and not the region held by the IRPT despite of UN assurance of checking the areas under the opposition control before sending their report to UN headquarters in New York. In another incidence, the opposition objected to a United Nations peace plan for Tajikistan on the grounds that it does not take opposition interests into account. Hajik Akbar Turajonzoda was quoted as telling that “We do not turn down their initiatives, but we are confident they do not offer a solution to the settlement in Tajikistan”. Earlier Nuri had criticized the UN Secretary General’s special envoy to Tajikistan, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, for completely ignoring government violation of cease-fire agreement during the inter-Tajik talks. Nuri in his letter to Priz-Ballon categorically mentioned that “Your Excellency is making a one-sided judgment and has not even mentioned the clashes in Tavildara……as you always make one sided judgment, my trust in you has decreased”. Despite of losing faith on international observers the opposition and the government continued the political dialogue under the UN supervision.

Government and opposition accused each other for breaking the peace agreements. It was difficult to analyze which side was acting as an offensive force. Tension and mistrust between warring factions towards each other prevented implementation of peace agreement as each side feared losing military and psychological advantages. There were frequent amnesties treaties signed between the government and the warring groups but were never implemented.

After Imomali Rahmon came to power, the relations between the government and the opposition were further worsened. There were frequent attacks on the detachments of Kulyab factions in Kurgan-Tyube from the Afghan border and Shar-Shar pass area. This was because Kulyabis were trying to consolidate its control over the entire Khatlon region. Kulyabis got involved in ethnic cleansing of pro-opposition Pamiris and Qarategnies that led to thier fleeing to their native homeland and Afghanistan. The opposition party was declared illegal and death sentences and arrest warrants were issued against the opposition leaders that made them take refuge in Iran, Afghanistan and Moscow.

There were also rumors that led to security predicament. Such as in 1991, there were rumors about attack on the Russians and Russian speaking population in Gissar that not only led many Russian and Russian speaking population left the country or migrated to other towns but also led to active Russian involvement in the Tajik civil war. In May 1992, during the mass demonstrations there were various rumors claiming that the participants of the pro-government rallies are against Islam and Sharia’h. There were also rumors about several thousand Lokaytsy horsemen (an Uzbek ethnic group) who were supporters of the government, had set out for Dushanbe from Kulyab. The situation got more fragile when the chief Muslim official of Kulyab, Haidar Sharifzoda, called upon the authorities to give arms to the pro-government demonstrators in Shahidan Square and that there were rumors about the loss of weapons from the armories of one of the service units in Kulyab Oblast.

Democratization process

Tajikistan has no experience of democracy and the democracy is only in name. The concept is imposed from above rather than developing from within the society. Just before the elections most of the opposition parties are created by the ruling elite in order to maintain democratic norms. However, often the opposition parties are banned and their leaders charged with false accusation before the elections. The elections are rigged. Sobotov, financial manager of an international organization, told that, “on the day of recent presidential election I asked my wife why I should go to cast my vote when I already know what the result is going to be”. It is widely alleged that sometimes it is already decided about the total number of votes for a particular candidate.

Sangak Safarov, leader of Peoples Front, in his speech in the parliamentary session, after Rahmon was appointed the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and pro-government forces took over Dushanbe, mentioned that “We will cleanse Tajikistan and Russia of the democratic scum!”.
There is no room for opposition parties to develop or propagate their ideology. The opposition parties lack financial resources to work effectively. There is often banning of the opposition parties like in August 1991 President Makhamov signed a decree banning the political parties and movements. Again in September 1991 when Aslonov took charge of Tajikistan he immediately banned the newly formed Socialist Party of Tajikistan earlier known as Communist Party of Tajikistan, under Shodi Shobdulov.

During the time of civil war, number of prominent figures and journalists were put behind bar on charges of conspiracy to seize power, using the mass media to stir up civil disorder, murder, hostage-taking, attacks on state institutions and various other offensives. According to the Russian radio, Mirbobo Mirrahimov, the former head of the Tajik television and radio, Jumakhon Azizmamadov, former deputy chief of Dushanbe internal affairs directorate, Ahmadsho Kalimov, Kaireddin Kosimov and Khurshed Nazarov, all senior officials of the so-called Popular TV station, and Ajik Aliyev and Rahimjonov, member of the presidium of IRPT were arrested. Criminal proceedings were initiated against Akbar Kahorov, leader of the Tajik Kaziyat, Shodmon Yusupov, the Chairman of the Democratic Party, Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, a prominent member of the IRPT and Davlat Usmonov, the former deputy premier. Abdumalik Abdullojonov, acting premier from 1992-93 was charged for armed blockade in South regions of the republic during the armed standoff. In addition it was reported that between 1992-94 there were around 35 journalists who were killed and more than 200 had to flee the country. All these acts suggested that no opposition was tolerated in the republic.

By thwarting the development of democratic institutions, the present leaders of the Central Asian Republics have eliminated the possibilities of political change being effected without a convulsion. The unpredictability of succession breeds instability. In all likelihood, the old guard former Communist elite that has been in power continuously since the mid or late 1980s is going to be replaced by a younger generation of nationalists who might be more emphatically inclined towards the forces representing tradition and religion (radical Islam not completely out ruled). He further analyses that, “The Central Asian states have moved from a single party totalitarian system to a personalized authoritarianism of their executive presidents”. R.R.Sharma, terms the political system as “façade democracies” which has been imposed from above, and where democracy has been reduced to so-called formal elections. Such a system is what he considers is “static and fragile”. The lack of elite-mass linkages and socio-political dialogue is not only retarding socio-economic development, but also encouraging traditionalist-conservative formations by pushing back the formation of a healthy civil society.

Media

There was no freedom of press and the local media speaks the language of the government. To a great extent, it was responsible for forming a negative opinion regarding the opposition movement activists. IRPT and some other organizations did have their own Radio station and newspapers sometimes published outside e.g. Chirog-e Russ but the national TV channels and main newspapers were under the control of the government. The independent journalists or those who wrote against the government were put behind the bars under false allegations.

It was noted that the Russian Fund for the Protection of glasnost, which works to promote media freedom, had sent an appeal to the then Russian ambassador to Tajikistan, Mechislav Senkevich, over the increasing number of cases of interference by the Tajik authorities in the work of Russian journalists. “The funds cited the example of Tajik Culture and Information Minister Bobokhon Mahmadov, who personally ‘recommended’ last May that Tatyana Lougnov, a journalist from the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (who run the Russian TV channel), should not broadcast a report on the assassination of two leading Tajik academics. The appeal added that a similar ‘recommendation’ had been received by the Russian NTV correspondent, Oldizhon Ashurov, a week later. Video tapes have also been confiscated from Russian cameramen and one Russian newspaper reporter was barred from visiting an area of hostilities in the central district of Tavildara, the agency said.

In the post-Soviet era the newspaper circulation has reduced sharply due to high expense of material, government pressure and control, refusal to renew license, persecution of journalists and no opposition newspaper were operating in the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections.

Economic crises and economic discrimination

Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the economic and socio-political situation deteriorated not only in Tajikistan but in the entire erstwhile Soviet republics. There was shortage of food products, drop of agricultural production, closure of factories and industries, dropping in the salaries of the professionals, and scarcity of electricity and power supply. The supply of the products from one rayon to the other was also blocked. There was regular breach of economic agreement between the two oblasts. For example, during the civil war there was no delivery of meat and cotton from Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and potato’s from Gharms and Tajikabad to Dushanbe.

The new economic situation and policies were not well taken by the people of Tajikistan. In one of President Nabiev’s visit to Dangara rayon in January 1992, and after meeting the heads of local soviets, heads of enterprises of the agro-industrial complex, heads of local trade unions and local intellectuals, he expressed his concern that the people were showing more and more discontent towards the introduction of price liberalization. The situation was getting more difficult because in some places officials had not fixed the maximum limit on regulatory prices. Trade organizations were selling the same goods with different prices. This caused anger and indignation among the consumers and mistrust towards law-enforcement bodies.

Opportunistic politicians

The weak state structure and lack of strong political ideology facilitated power-hungry politicians to use undemocratic means and unsubstantiated reasons to gain and maintain power. The failure to recognize the real cause that was lying in the rigid local clan based political contradiction within the society made the situation tensed. The blames and counter blames, removal of Nabiev or changing the constitutional structure failed to vent out regional hatred.
Demonstrations were organized with not much knowledge about the reason due to lack of information and propaganda both by the government and the opposition. The ignorance amongst the people was exploited both by the government and the opposition. For example in March 1989, several dozen young people gathered for meetings without reason that got out of control. When tried to find out the motives, who directed them towards unlawful actions, and what interests and aims they pursue for their demonstration, the third year students mentioned about the problems like environment, the Arabic script, and Navruz. But when asked whether they were familiar with the resolution of the Tajik Council of Ministers on the holding of Navruz or with the Law on the Procedure for Holding Rallies and Meetings, they said that they had no time for television or the newspapers. Another important point was that the people who took part in the meeting were of the same nationality, which caused an alarming and damaging situation in the city.

Inadequate safeguards for the minority rights

There were no efforts made by the government to safeguard the rights of the minorities. The language law that made Tajiki an official language discourage the Russian and Russian speaking population to live in Tajikistan. Russia itself was in a weak social and economic position and was not in a prepared to accommodate the migration of a large population from Central Asian region. So Russia took immediate steps to arrest the shaky situation in Tajikistan. Other ethnic minorities like Uzbkes, Jews and Bahai community were also targeted.

Women stake

In October 1992, women from areas around Dushanbe organized mass rally outside the Supreme Soviet building demanding an immediate end to the fratricidal war. Many thousand women from Gissar joined “the peace march” in Dushanbe on 8 December 1992 demanding to participate as the third party in the negotiation between Safarali Kendzhayev forces, occupying a combatant position in Gissar, and representatives of the Gissar detachments. They aimed to save their husbands and sons from the senseless war.

Political Parties organized along ethno-regional lines

Islamic Rebirth Party (IRPT), officially registered in December 1991, got their main support from Southwest Tajikistan i.e. Qarategin valley. There were also forces loyal to Haji Akbar Turajonzoda (chief Islamic cleric of the Republic), known as the leader of Islamic democrats.
The Rastokhez Popular Movement and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) were anti-Marxist reformist parties that wanted to establish democracy, market economy and more evenhanded distribution of power. They were representatives of elite having their support base in Dushanbe.

La’li- Badakshan, under the leadership of Atobek Amiirbekov, was a party whose members were primarily Pamiri people campaigned for greater autonomy for the mountainous Badakshan region and the political, social, economic and educational development of the Badakshan. At no point did the people of Badakshan wanted to succeed from Tajikistan. Though they united with the opposition and took part in several inter-Tajik negotiations that were held from 1994 to 1997, it left United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in December 1999. Another party of this region was Nosiri Khusraw a non-political association of Badakshan region.

Popular Front (PF), know as Sitodi Melli in Tajik, was a party of Kulyabi paramilitary forces which brought President Rahmon to power.

During the war the IRPT, DPT and Rastokhez Movement united under a common banner of United Tajik Opposition.

In 1990, Shodmon Yusuf founded the Democratic Party of Tajikistan that led a successful mobilization of majority of population in August 1991 against the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT), the majority of the members of the CPT came from the Sogdh and the Kulyab region.

In late 1996, the people living in the north formed a political opposition party the National Revival Party (NRP), also called Union for National Reconciliation, under the leadership of Abdulmalik Abduladjanov, former prime minister of Tajikistan and contested against Rahmon during 1994 presidential elections. They formed the party due to complete exclusion of the northern region from the reconciliation process, between the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) that took place from 1994 to 1997.

Lack of or delayed international response to the internal crises of Tajikistan

Repeated appeals were made by President Nabiev to the international organizations to get involved in the internal crisis of Tajikistan. When the opposition fighters attacked Nurek Power station, Nabiev appealed to Air force Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov of Russia to undertake the protection of the key industrial facilities of the republic. The units of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) called “blue helmets” an allied armed forces, took over the responsibility. However, the political opposition and the top Muslim clergy resisted the proposal as they considered that the presence of a “foreign military contingent” in the conflict zone as interference in Tajikistan’s internal affairs.

On his trip to Pyanj in Gorno Badakshon Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in August 1992, Nabiev expressed his concern towards the illegal arms and drug smuggling (for drug smuggling the old Silk Route was revived to export drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe through Central Asia) and immigrants coming from Afghanistan. He feared that such activities could turn Tajikistan into another Afghanistan. He called upon the CIS and Russian federation to help Tajikistan guard its borders with Afghanistan from arms and drugs smuggling but not involve themselves in resolving internal crises.

During the war the general conduct of Nabiev and later Rahmon’s, came under severe national and international criticism. Uzbek President Karimov openly criticized Nabiev for his inefficiency in maintaining law and order.

Initially the international community was disinterested in Tajik crisis as the entire region has tough terrains, meager of resources, connectivity problem thus discouraging the international media to expose the internal situation. Tajiks ethnic groups also lacked strong lobby in the west. In addition to this, events of Tajikistan did not directly effected Europe and the US. It was only after the radical activities of al-Qaida the US and the western world started taking interest in Tajikistan. Tajikistan being one of the main transit routes for drugs further made it a sensitive area.

Since the 1997 peace deal, President Rahmon has maintained political stability in Tajikistan despite ongoing phases of political and territorial fragility. Incursion by renegade commander Makhmud Khudoiberdiev (ethnic Uzbek) in 1998; spate of political killing in 2001; confrontation between President and former warlords since early 2004; and ongoing tensions with neighbouring Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has kept the situation in Tajikistan fragile. The Soviet-style centralization and dominance of Rahmon’s own small elite has fuelled acute corruption, inefficiency and economic deterioration resulting in Tajikistan remaining among world’s poorest countries. Illicit trade in heroin, principally from Afghanistan, has been a major security issue on Tajik border—guarded by Russian troops till recently. Warlordism and regionalism remains crucial to the success or failure of political process. Three opposition parties (Democratic Party, Socialist Party and IRP) formed broad-based coalition on May 2004 with the goal of presenting credible challenge to the government party in the 2005 elections.

However, the present government of Rehmon has been successful in completely quashing any credible opposition. The government has achieved this objective by the use of media, applying coercive means, international support, corruption, monitoring, threatening, misuse of judiciary. Suppressing freedom of speech and expression and tainting the opposition as being responsible for the civil war. The imposed peace is also successful as the opposition is weak and divided.

Security Challenges to India-Bangladesh Relations

2011-02-02T13:20:00.004+05:30

http://www.claws.in/Working_Paper_1_-_MMK.pdf

Centre for Land Warfare Studies

The working paper takes a historic-political and analytical approach with special reference to the contentious issue between India and Bangladesh. The second chapter studies the difficulties concerning India-Bangladesh border management and the possible solutions to overcome it. The third chapter critically studies the development of the extremist organisations within Bangladesh and their linkages with Indian extremist outfits. The fourth chapter examines the causes and consequences of the illegal migration from Bangladesh particularly in the north-eastern states of India. The final chapter concludes by examining and assessing the possible solutions to deal with the border security, preventing illegal immigration, infiltration and terrorism emanating from Bangladesh.

India's Energy Security Interests in Central Asia

2009-11-11T10:40:00.002+05:30

Published in: Centre for Land Warfare Studies\

Web Link : http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=432&u_id=57

Date: 11/11/09

Energy prices play an important role in political and economic life and matters to state policymakers because energy prices can threaten economic, environmental and national security. The threat to economic security is represented by the possibility of declining economic growth, increasing inflation, rising unemployment, and losing billions of dollars in investment. Hindrance in energy supply can also lead to rise to various geopolitical risks that include delivery of the service, changes in executive and legislative power, labor union activities, internal politics and regulatory stances, as well international relations of a country.

India is a sixth largest energy consumer and it is estimated that each year the energy consumption of India is likely to increase by 5%. The main reason government imposes control on petroleum products such as diesel, kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is to help millions who live on less than $1 a day other than remaining in power and to check the inflation. The Indian government spent almost $9 billion last year on fuel subsidies, added to the country's budget deficit. State-run gasoline retailers have been losing billions of dollars as well because they are forced to sell to consumers at prices set by New Delhi. Last year when three largest state-owned oil companies warned in 2008 that they would soon run out of money to import oil, the government finally raised price caps. Since June 4, 2008 petrol is up by 11%, diesel by 10% and LPG by 17%. The price of kerosene, the most widely used cooking fuel, was left unchanged but the rise in prices of petrol, diesel and cooking gas has led to inflation going up to a 13-year high of 11.05 per cent. However, there has been fluctuation in the petrol prices since then due to the election in 2009 and fall in the international oil price.

India is seeking oil assets in countries such as Kazakhstan, Sudan, Vietnam, Iran and Ecuador through Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd. (OVL). Presently, OVL has stakes in 24 oil and gas projects spread across 14 countries including Vietnam, Myanmar, and Sudan. It is believed that Central Asian Republics (CARs) also have huge reserves of oil and natural gas, which can provide an alternative for the fast depleting resources in the rest of the world and can reduce India’s dependence on the West Asian oil supplies. However, many experts believe that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not likely to ease up their energy-export advantage due to their geo-political disadvantage.

New Delhi has been active in joint oil exploration and having its stakes in energy producing region. The recent visit by the President of India to Russia and Tajikistan (2nd to the 8th September, 2009) was not only meant to enhance goodwill, trust and mutual confidence but also to explore the opportunities related to economic cooperation and energy security. The President was accompanied by the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Murli Deora and other high-level delegation. The visit came a month after the “Dushanbe Four” Summit held in Tajikistan where the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Russia. There were some positive economic (related particularly to electricity transfer from Tajikistan to Pakistan) and defence developments for Islamabad to establish its toehold in CARs directly and through developing its relations with Russia thus, reflecting the competing interests of India and Pakistan over energy resources in the region.

Earlier on 25-26 November, 2008, Indian petroleum ministry’s decision to invite Central Asian countries including Azerbaijan and Russia, the biggest crude producer outside the Opec cartel, to attend India-CIS Round Table conference in New Delhi, which was held after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) St. Petersburg Summit of June 2008. The New Delhi conference was organised to explore the possibilities of importing petroleum from the oil rich Caucasian and Central Asian countries to India. It is expected that India can have an advantage as the CIS summit of St. Petersburg brought Russia back to the centre stage despite of strong US lobby against the Moscow. In order to have its firm hold over the resources in CARs, New Delhi needs to re-explore and exploit its historical ties with Moscow.

In April 2008, India and Kazakhstan, the biggest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries after Russia and is among the top ten countries in terms of hydrocarbon energy reserves as also mineral resources including uranium, agreed to enhance bilateral trade and economic cooperation particularly in the hydrocarbon sector. OVL already has a 15 percent holding in Kazakhstan’s Alibekmola oil fields and a 10 percent holding in the country’s Kurmangazi fields. India is also pitching for its stake in Russian Sakhalin-3 project, on the lines of India’s interest in Sakhalin-1. This was highlighted during the Petroleum Minister Murli Deora visit to Russia in the first week of November 2008.

The governments of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan has last year reaffirmed their desire to expand their deliveries of oil and gas northward through Russian controlled pipelines connecting Central Asia with European markets. At the same time both countries remain interested in delivering large quantities of oil and gas through Iran to South Asia. They are also looking forward to diversifying their export routes westward to supplement their hydrocarbon exports through Russia, Iran, and China.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are important from the perspective of world energy markets for the reasons that these two countries possess extensive oil and gas reserves within their territories and their geographic location allows them to function as potential gateways for energy exports from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe and the Mediterranean region. At the same time, Iran has been improving its Caspian port infrastructure to encourage Central Asian governments to send more oil and gas southward to its Persian Gulf ports. For example, Iranians are constructing a massive trade and port facility at Bandar-e Anzali and Bandar-e ‘Abbâs.

Work and efforts to develop a technically and commercially viable project on Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline are currently on. TAPI is backed by US but has dim chances due to the instability in Afghanistan. However, Washington opposes India, Pakistan and Iran’s 2,700-kilometer IPI "peace" pipeline that is likely to transfer Iranian natural gas from its South Pars field to India via Pakistan. However, India hasn’t agreed to join the project. At the same time New Delhi would like Washington’s involvement in the project for the smooth supply of gas to India by exerting pressure on Pakistan if need be. Iran is now working towards extending the project to China instead of India due to delays in finalising modalities and the fluctuating relations and mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan.

Existing international trends are making Central Asian leaders turn willingly to Moscow. India’s initiative in Central Asia and its efforts to involve Russia would not only benefit Moscow in Central Asia but can also pave the way for Russia’s economic expansion into Indian markets. Such developments are also likely to bring Central Asia and South Asia region economically and culturally closer. In addition, if India wants to be a global player, it needs to develop multiple strategies for security and economic cooperation. At the same time, India must remain economically, technically and culturally engaged in the region through inter-governmental agreements to achieve its long term objectives. It is also important to build people-to-people contact by organising cultural and educational exchange fares and programs.

India's Concerns in Central Asia

2009-10-06T14:30:00.005+05:30

Publisher: Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Date: 6/10/2009
Web Link: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=413&u_id=57

It is widely acknowledged by the strategic community that 9/11 has changed the security environment in Central Asia and has underlined the need for new political and geo-strategic arrangements to create a stable world order. Situated in a close vicinity of India, concerns in the Central Asia Republics (CARs) include trans-national challenges such as terrorism; extremism; narcotic and arms trafficking; ecological security and protection of the environment. A tremor in the security environment in Central Asia can directly threaten India’s security particularly due to faster transportation, communication, technology and presence of rich mineral resources that play an important role in bringing Central Asia to international attention and India’s strategic interest.

Ethno-regional identities are stronger sub-national identities amongst the Central Asians and can create social and political instability in the region. Although Islam is the predominant religion practiced in the region, it has failed to become a unifying ethnic identity for the Central Asians. The long experience of moderate Islam during the Soviet period and the fear among Central Asians that Islamic identity may erode the prevalent territorial integrity, has made them conscious and sensitive towards their religious identity. However, the threat of al-Qaeda’s influence throughout Central Asia and the rise of extremist groups in the Fergana Valley connecting Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan present an immediate regional security threat, and cannot be ignored. It can convert the economically, politically and socially fragile and autocratic nations, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, into Afghan style anarchies principally when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are actively engaged in increasing their influence in the region and peddling a Wahabi brand of pan-Islamic identity.

Pakistan's involvement in Central Asia is in continuation with General Zia-ul Haq's policy of creating a 'zone of strategic depth' in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Kashmir. These policies were aimed to bring the region under Islamabad's command and to find a gateway to Central Asia for economic, strategic and religious purposes. Islamabad has been arguing that the region stretching from Pakistan to Turkey and from Kazakhstan to Iran and the Gulf is a logically integrated strategic and security region.

Most of the leaders of CARs are supportive of Pakistan on Indo-Pakistan issues in a bilateral framework due to shared religious identity. However, they still have close feelings for India due to their 70 years of interaction during the Soviet times. In fact, the economic and cultural linkages between Central Asia and South Asia date back to the Aryan civilization. Buddhism went to China via Central Asia and Islam was introduced to India by the Mughal’s, who ruled Indian sub-continent for around two centuries, came from Fergana Valley.

In the recent past, due to differences in political priorities and resource constraints, India has not converted its historical and cultural relations into a substantive bond. On the other hand, Pakistan has been quite active on building bilateral cultural and security relations. It has also been involved in translating, publishing and distributing the Holy Koran written in Russian language. Recently, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari attended a ‘Dushanbe Four’ Summit in Tajikistan with the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Russia, highlighting security concerns in the impoverished CARs and the possibility of transferring electricity from Tajikistan to Pakistan. During the summit, Zardari requested Russia to supply helicopters, aircraft, and other hardware for the Pakistan Army and help them modernise it and counter new regional challenges. Islamabad clearly aims at establishing economic and defence developments and get a toehold in the CARs directly and via developing relations with Russia.

The other security threat that engulfs the regional security arises from narcotic and arms trade. There are various reports that suggest a link between narcotics and terrorism, though this remains unconfirmed so far. Economic hardship, addiction, corruption and close proximity to Afghanistan make narcotic trade profitable. Illegal narcotic production in Afghanistan has risen more than 40 times since 2001. Even the US led military presence in Afghanistan is unable to check the production of opium and heroin. Much of the supply of narcotics shipped across Afghanistan's northern border, up to one-fifth of the country's output, has traveled to and through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan to Russia and other European countries.

Narcotic trafficking is one of the reasons for rampant corruption in Central Asian countries and is slowly turning them into narcotic trafficking conduits. Many western officials and regional observers suspect that the Central Asian governments, to some extent, controls the narcotic trade. It is also admitted by a few western officials that the western taciturn is the result of a political tradeoff as no one wants to risk alienating the governments on the issue of narcotic corruption because the cooperation of the authoritarian regimes is important for preventing Islamic militants from using the Tajik-Afghan or Tajik-Uzbek border as sanctuary.

The other security concern is the easy access to the chemical, biological and nuclear material used for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is also reported that CARs have become a transit route for the transit of material used for WMD usually moving southwards from Russia due to the porous and unguarded borders and poorly secured facilities.

To conclude, socio-economic and political security in the Central Asian countries will remain delicate as long as there is instability in Afghanistan, unchecked narcotic trade, feeble economy and authoritarian government remains in the region. India can facilitate in overcoming the security threats in CARs by not only sharing its experience and expertise in nation-building but also in combating terrorism through different methods and techniques.

India needs to cultivate its historical and cultural linkages in order to maintain goodwill and friendship with CARs. India also needs to develop new ideas and approaches in its foreign policy. In this regard, New Delhi must perceive CARs as an integral part of its strategic neighbourhood. It should also actively take part in Central Asian regional cooperation and security arrangements like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and should participate in military exercises. Defence and economic relations must be maintained along with educational, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation. India must also explore new avenues to enhance bilateral trade through the Commonwealth of Independent States as long as the land route through Afghanistan remains unstable.

Synopsis for International Seminar on Regional Cooperation and Security in Central Asia (5-6 December 2009)

2009-09-16T01:43:00.001+05:30

Religion and Politics in Tajikistan

Religion when politically active is associated with extremist representing the elite group thus detrimental to democracy. It can draw strong emotional appeal of the people as it can provide easy validation to any peaceful or violent agitation and in maintaining ethnic boundaries. The political history has revealed that the movements based on religion, whether for the establishment of the religious state or against it, have been successful in rising nationalist movements particularly in the countries who are in the process of developing political ideology and betrothed with economic crisis.

The political history of Tajikistan has shaped the religious orientation of the country. During the ancient and medieval times Tajikistan was at the crossroads of many civilizations. Some of the religions practiced in Tajikistan include Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Nestorian Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. However, presently Islam is the dominant religion practiced in Tajikistan. Presently, the influence of Islam, to a great extent, is imported from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

In the post-Soviet Tajikistan the role of religion in the politics of Tajikistan can be divided into four categories: first is represented by the fundamentalist like the Hizb ut-Tahrir who castoffs the democratic values and liberal culture. They aspire to establish Islamic law and morality; secondly are the traditionalists, which include the mullahs and some members of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) who seek to establish a conservative social order. They reject globalisation and modernity; third are modernists, some members of the IRPT come under this category working towards finding a meeting point between Islam and democracy. Finally, the secularists, under this category come the president’s party (Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan [PDPT]), communists, socialists and democrats.

Religion is politically represented by IRPT headed by Muhiddin Kabiri. It is regarded as the strongest opposition party in the parliament and politics of Tajikistan. However, the party membership remains regionally based. It is still searching for a definite political ideology and has not been so far successful in initiating an independent Islamic movement. However despite its political ambiguity, IRPT managed to become popular amongst the rural youth and Ishan, the local religious leaders of Sufi brotherhood. It also found acceptance amongst the women as the party acknowledging the status of women and does not impose the customary Islamic practices on them and during the civil war, IRPT, inspite of being exclusively of the Sunnis, it has also managed to gather support of the Shiite Ismailis. At the same time Tajik government has been making efforts in eliminating the burgeoning radical Islam from politics and society of Tajikistan and President Rahmon has become more secured of his position.

The president’s party wants to separate religion from the politics of the country. At the same time they have, on occasion used Islam as a means to develop nationalism and external relations with other Islamic nations. Religion is used for establishing a united country and to be part of Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the ideology of Muslim brotherhood is skillfully manipulated by the Tajik president, Imomali Rehmon, to be part of both the western and the Muslim world. The government has taken several measures to contain the Islamic extremism and Islamic opposition and its influence by undertaking certain stern steps under the constitution. However, sizeable section of population gets influenced by the propaganda of the extremists.

The idea of establishment of an Islamic “radical” state with popular support cannot become a reality in the present social and political environment of Tajikistan. However, if the economic crisis prolonged and the government is unable to work towards political adjustments, it is likely that Islam is likely to take radical roots in Tajikistan. It is also important to examine the association and interests of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in Tajikistan. This is important as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia provided money, jihadi fighters and training to Tajik opposition fighters that included IRPT, during the five years civil war of Tajikistan in 1990s.

This paper is an attempt to critically analyse the role of religion in Tajik society and politics. The paper derives its conclusion from Jeff Haynes statement that “in the course of modernisation, ethnic [and for that matter, religious] political identities and institutions are repeatedly created and recreated anew process that constantly destroys the old ethnic loyalties while creating new ethnic ideologies, institutions and constituencies.” Such efforts are detrimental to nation-building process as there is no unified fixed ethnic identity, other than religion, that can create a nation-state under one banner.

India and US Strategic Convergence in Central Asia

2009-09-03T13:35:00.003+05:30

Published: South Asia Monitor
Date: August 26,2009
Web Link: http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2009/Sept/news/2wsa4.shtml

India and the US share common interests and concerns in the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Following the intervention in Afghanistan by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the focus has particularly been on transnational threats and challenges, and geo-political and geo-economic adjustments in this region.

Transnational challenges include terrorism, extremism, drug and arms trafficking, ecological security and protection of the environment. It is important to note that changes in the means of transportation, communication and technology can play an important role in facilitating global access for the Central Asian region.

Geopolitical location and geographical conditions have an important role to play in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and organised crimes that have become important transnational security threats. Drugs dealers, who were earlier trading from Afghanistan with coverage across South Asia, have now found clientele in Russia and Europe.

Transnational migration, transportation and the use of ethnic affiliations for drug trade due to trust factor ensures that the drug and arms trade flourish. Drug trafficking constitute one of the largest sources of illegal proceeds as they create strong financial base for terrorist organisations to conduct illegal traffic in arms. Such non-state actors have transnational ties, creating movements trespassing state borders and therefore requires consolidated inter-regional and international approaches.

There are also concerns about the rise of Islamic extremism in the region due to the close proximity with Afghanistan and Pakistan; social vacuum created by ethnic and identity issues amongst the Central Asians which will be filled by religious identities; authoritarian governments that can give rise to resistance by ethnic groups uniting and getting international support under the common banner of religion; lack of political experience and willingness for political, administrative and economic accommodation amongst the leaders; and economic constraints leading to exploitation of youth by religious fanatics.

The economic prospects for India and US in CARs include natural resources such as uranium, gold copper, diamond and other rare minerals. Energy potential is other priority areas where It is estimated that each year the energy consumption of India is likely to increase by 5% and US about 9%. India and the US seek its access to meet their domestic requirements and contain Chinese. The huge reserve of oil and natural gas can provide an alternative for the fast depleting resources in the rest of the world and reduce dependence on West Asian oil supplies.

The "oil route" to India includes Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI). The prospects of this pipeline, however, are bleak due to instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan, although has huge oil and gas reserves, remains physically distant. Poor quality of gas and technological challenges makes access difficult. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of India to bid its stakes in order to have a say in international oil politics.

US interest in CARs is to establish itself as a counter to Russian and Chinese dominance in the region. However, China has managed to establish its firm economic grip in the entire region, much against US and India’s interest. Nonetheless, it may be noted that China is treated with suspicion in the region and viewed as an expansionist. Russia though still holds a special position in the CAR’s, feels uneasy by the aggressive presence of China.

In fact, India can play an important role in neutralising the US, Russia and Chinese competing positions in CARs as India and Russia continues to enjoy historical, strategic and friendly ties since India’s total defence purchase from Russia accounts to approximately 75% of its total imports. In 1990s, Russia desired for active involvement of India in the CARs which led to India's military cooperation in Tajikistan; cooperation in the project on north-south corridor; and joint exploration of oil and natural gas in Central Asia. At the same time, it is unlikely that India and the US can act as a potential competitor to China due to physical and psychological distance, limited market and endemic corruption that have prevented private businessmen to invest or explore Central Asian market.

It is also important to note that although Pakistan's international image of harboring terrorism has prevented it from finding a gateway to Central Asia, it is likely that in a long run Pakistan can have an edge over India as it can provide access to landlocked CARs with its ports through Karakoram highway and can cleverly play a pan-Islamic card.

Pakistan's involvement in Central Asia’s southern neighbourhood is a continuation of Zia-ul Haq's policy of creating a 'zone of strategic depth' that will include Central Asia, Afghanistan and Kashmir. These policies are aimed to bring the region under Islamabad's command and to find a gateway to Central Asia for economic, strategic and religious purposes.

India shares deep historical ties with the CARs. It was one of the four countries having an embassy in Central Asia during the Soviet times and presently India is regarded as a "soft power" due to its economic and technological assistance through Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation. However, New Delhi has not been able to establish itself firmly in the region as it has always remained away from internal political and cultural developments.

The economic and cultural engagements remain limited at inter-governmental level. Thus, in order to enhance its economic interest in the region, India needs to work towards the revival of Silk Route. CARs also lack manpower resources that can be filled in by India’s readily available manpower resource. The only handicap here is that of language.

In the post-Soviet era, although US started its bilateral relations with the CAR’s at a positive note, it could not maintain its goodwill particularly after the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) Georgia; Andijon carnage (2005) Uzbekistan and the Tulip Revolution (2005) Kyrgyzstan, where US was accused of being involved in financing and supporting the uprising against the government.

To conclude, both India and the US would like to see the establishment of human rights; democracy; press freedom; promotion of civil rights; and political, social and economic stability in the region in order to prevent ascendance of separatist and extremist activities. However, India has higher stakes in the Central Asia as instability in CARs can have its "dominos effect" on South Asian security.

In order to be a global player, India needs to develop multiple strategies for security and economic cooperation. India must also remain economically, technically and culturally engaged in the region through inter-governmental agreements and regional organisation. However, the US needs to look beyond the "war on terrorism" and provide financial assistance for the development of infrastructures and become keenly engaged research and exploration based projects. It must work with the regional governments in order to achieve goodwill in the longer term.

Condolance: A "Revolutionary" passed away on 21.04.2009.

2009-04-24T13:49:00.012+05:30

I am deeply sadden to hear about the death of Tohir Abdujabbor, a noble man, an intellectual, and the founder of the "Rastokhez" (Revival) - the first movement of Tajikistan for independence.

I met him at BBC office during my visit to Tajikistan in 2007. He was a soft spoken modest man with high intellect. He was patient enough to take out an hour for the interview. Bobojon shared his spiritual experience in India and remembered his visit to Kashmir.

Tohir Abdurjabbor was saddened by the political and economic condition of Tajikistan. However, he felt helpless as his co-rebel leaders have changed their ideology over time.

He said that the only mistake Rastokhez movement did was to identify itself with Islamic religious identity instead of Tajik cultural identity.

May God Bless You and Your Family During this Time and Always

Mansi

About Tohir Abdujabbor/

Asia Plus:

Founder of Rastokhez movement Tohir Abdujabbor passes away

21.04.2009 15:26, by Daler Ghufronov

DUSHANBE, April 21, 2009,, Asia-Plus -- Mr. Tojir Abdujabbor, founder of open the first informal public movements of Tajikistan, Rastokhez (Revival) also author of the alternative version of Declaration of Independence of Tajikistan, died in Khujand today afternoon, aged 64 after a long illness, Asia-Plus has learned from the Sughd journalist Najmiddin Shohinbod.

Tohir Abdujabbor had scientific degree of Candidate of Science in Economics and in the 1980’s he had worked with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences. From 1990 to 1992, Tohir Abdujabbor was member of the Shuroi Oli (Tajikistan’s parliament in 1990-1992). He was one of founders of the public movement Rastokhez (Revival).

The Rastokhez movement was founded on September 14, 1989, by representatives of the Tajik intelligentsia, among them Tohir Abdujabbor, with a moderate nationalist and democratic program. The movement ceased to exist at the same time as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and its members mostly joined the Democratic Party at the time of peace treaty (June 1997).

When the civil war started in Tajikistan in 1992, Tohir Abdujabbor left for Iran and then to Kyrgyzstan. In Bishkek, he worked as head of the Department of International Economy at Bishkek Diplomatic University.

He returned to Tajikistan n 2005. Over the past two years, Tohir Abdujabbor had worked with Tajik University of Innovative Technologies and Communications in Dushanbe. In 2008, Tohir Abdujabbor also worked with the News Agency Asia-Plus as an expert in economic issues.

SEMINAR ON 'TAJIKISTAN TODAY'

2008-03-28T14:30:00.005+05:30

ABSTRACT
RELIGION AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MARKER IN TAJIKISTAN

Religion when politically active is associated with extremist representing the elite group thus detrimental to democracy. It can draw strong emotional appeal of the people as it can provide easy validation to any peaceful or violent agitation and in maintaining ethnic boundaries. The political history has revealed that the movements based on religion, whether for the establishment of the religious state or against it, have been successful in rising nationalist movements particularly in the countries with developing political ideology and economic crisis.

The history of Tajikistan has shaped the religious orientation of the country. During the ancient and medieval times Tajikistan was at the crossroads of many religions and civilizations. Some of the religions like, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Nestorian Christianity, Judaism, and Islam flourished in Tajikistan.

Presently, Islam is the dominant religion in Tajikistan. The ideology of Muslim brotherhood is skillfully manipulated by Tajik president Imomali Rahmon to be part of both the western and Muslim world. On the other hand President has been until now successful in eliminating the burgeoning radical Islam within its territories.

This paper is an attempt to critically analyse the role of religion in Tajik society and politics. The paper derives its conclusion from Jeff Haynes statement that “in the course of modernization, ethnic [and for that matter, religious] political identities and institutions are repeatedly created and recreated anew process that constantly destroys the old ethnic loyalties while creating new ethnic ideologies, institutions, and constituencies.” Such efforts are detrimental to nation building as there is no unified fixed ethnic idenity, other than religion, that can creat a nation-state under one banner.

Tajikistan and Afghanistan: Budding Relations

2008-03-10T20:47:00.006+05:30

Published in Tajikistanweb.com on 23/03/08 in English and Cyrillic Persian
http://tajikistanweb.com/230308_tajafghan.html

The River Panj (Pyanj) forms a natural border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan is ethnically close to Tajikistan with substantial Tajik population residing in Afghanistan. History has shown that an unstable Afghanistan has acted as a springboard for civil and political instability and committing armed sabotage in Tajikistan.

The geo-strategic importance of Tajikistan and Afghanistan can be traced in the history where the 'Great Game' was played between Russia and British India in the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Basmachi revolt (1924-1928) [according to Ahmed Rashid Basmachi* was "known as the movement of the ‘bek’, freeman peasants and tribal guerrilla forces …… associated with nationalism and Islam as was the term ‘Mujahedeen’ used by the Afghan rebels fifty years later"], was reportedly supported by Afghanistan and British India. It was from their base in Afghanistan that the Basmachis carried out their attacks and took control of many regions of Tajikistan, particularly in Gorno-Badakhshan region.

History was repeated in post-Soviet disintegration. With the fall of Tajikistan's (short-term) Islamic-Democratic coalition government in November 1992, Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) took refuge in Afghanistan due to Tajik President Imomali Rahmon’s offensive policies against the members of the Tajik opposition political parties. During the civil war, the opposition forces started operating from Afghanistan.

From Afghanistan, the Tajik Islamist opposition launched several attacks on Tajik government forces and Russian Border Forces with the help of foreign mercenaries. Sangak Safarov, militia leader of Popular Front and the man who brought Rahmon to power in 1992, stated in February 1993, that "around 70 'foreign mercenaries' were captured by the government forces during the Tajik conflict that included Afghan mujahedeen, people from the Caucasus, and a number of African students." These foreign mercenaries were not only involved in killing and hostage-taking of Russian Border troops but also provided transport and air cover to the Islamist opposition fighters.

From their bases in Afghanistan, Tajik opposition used Taloqan, the area controlled by Ahmad Shah Masood, military leader of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, as political headquarters of the IRPT. Another base in Kunduz was reportedly used by foreign Arab militants for conducting programs related to ideological, religious and probably military training.

There were many incidences where Tajikistan's special services intercepted and got hold of coded messages from opposition in Afghanistan recommending that terrorist acts against the Tajik leadership be stepped up. There was continuous information and regular incidences about the secretly piled arms and ammunition's that were hidden in the mountainous area on the Tajik-Afghan border, and that mujahedeen were hiding in almost inaccessible mountain area of Qarategin of Tajikistan. There were also many anti-government guerrilla groups that were known to be operating in a number of inaccessible parts of the Pamirs, in particular in the Tavildara and Darwaz districts. At the same time it should be noted that these groups were relatively small and many of these groups did not have the support of the local population.

It was reported on 8 December 1992, that three Afghan Air Force helicopters crossed the border and landed in the village of Ayvadz, in Tajikistan, where they left a 50 to 60-strong armed battalion to support the Islamist fighters against the Russian and the pro-government forces.

When Taliban took over Afghanistan, Masood took refuge in Tajik territory. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the existence of Masood's aircraft in the area was also confirmed by a US diplomat in Tajikistan. The newspaper also said that "The Kulab public is openly voicing fears that the Taliban could start bombing the city, since the servicemen of their enemy are deployed there" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1997).

It is widely believed that after Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, IRPT closed its bases there. IRPT adopted a neutral stand towards Taliban as their people were still in the conflict zone in Afghanistan.

There were reports that claimed that Islamic opposition might align with Taliban movement to continue their fight against the government as the Islamists came under pressure from Iran and the Northern Alliance to reconcile with Tajik government due to their own fears against the Taliban movement. But according to Olivier Roy, there were some important issues that would have prevented them to be close to the movement due to exclusion of Tajik or Uzbek ethnic community from the movement. Secondly, the radical approach, although would have appealed individual leaders among Tajik Islamists, such movement would not be accepted in a comparatively secular and moderate Tajik society.

Since Afghanistan shares long and close border with Tajikistan, it gave the Islamic opposition an opportunity to manoeuvre Tajik crisis. The partnership between the opposition and the Afghan mujahedeen helped in easy cross-border narcotic and arms trade. In addition, close interaction with the mujahedeen resulted in a resurgence of an extreme Islam amongst the Tajiks of Tajikistan, thus facilitating the gradual restoration of radical Islam and officially instituted political Islam in the region.

An unhinged Tajik-Afghan border required manifold international efforts to maintain order including development of civil and political society, peace, security and stability in Afghanistan. Tajik's Islamic identity unites them internationally with the Muslim brotherhood but nationally they remain divided on ethno-regional differences.

Apart from security concern, landlocked Tajikistan needs the assistance of Afghanistan to find transit routes to the ports of Iran facilitated by three bridges that are built on Tajik-Afghan border. In addition, Afghanistan can also provide transit to the export of electricity to South Asia and Iran.
________________
*Basmachi is a pejorative term of Turkic origin meaning ‘bandit(s)’ applied to the Central Asian anti-Soviet opposition by the Red Army – tajikistanweb.com

Tajikistan: Challenging Amnesty Law and Act of Mutual Forgiveness

2008-03-09T22:01:00.007+05:30

Published in Tajikistanweb.com in English and Cyrillic Persian
http://tajikistanweb.com/090308_amnestylaw.html

The death of Shamsuddin Shamsuddinov has again raised the question of commitment of the present government towards the implementation of General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan signed between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in Moscow on 27 June 1997 that led to the formal establishment of peace in Tajikistan. After four years in prison in Tajik capital, Dushanbe, Shamsuddin Shamsuddinov (55 year), a key figure of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) during the country's civil war of 1992-97, died in January 2008. He was denied appropriate legal assistance.

In ethno-regional political culture of Tajikistan, Shasuddinov was the only northerner to be elected as the chairman of the IRPT that was otherwise the party of the southerners. Apparently the objective was to graduate a regional party to national party and get the support of Sogdh, northern part of Tajikistan that is rich in resources.

It may be noted that one of the documents of peace agreement included Amnesty Law and Act on Mutual Forgiveness included general amnesty and forgiveness for political prisoners. In 1998, under the general amnesty, UTO submitted a list of 5,377 former combatants who were to be pardoned as part of their integration into state and military structure. The arbitrary arrests and detention of the UTO fighters remains serious problems since the establishment of formal peace. In addition, the question on reform of the power structures and the distribution of the ex-UTO personnel among them is still contested.

The gross human rights violation in Tajikistan has become a norm. The number of death penalties with unfair and secrete trials have been alarming. According to Tajik constitution, the trials are to be held in public and principle of juries is to be adopted, excluding in cases involving security or the protection of minors. In reality, the prisoners are denied fair public trial. The system of 'checks and balance’ does not exist because the judges and prosecutors are appointed, promoted and dismissed by the president with the approval of the parliament. Thus, judiciary remains under the control of the executive.

According to international observers, lack of knowledge among the people regarding the law keeps the trial unjust. In addition, lack of technical knowledge of both the judges and the prosecutors and the low wages keep the proceedings and judgments susceptible. The government undertook some corrective measures to improve the overall judicial situation by holding judges accountable for their decisions and making provisions for arresting the corrupt judges and prosecutors. But the public accountability of the government's efforts remain under critical scrutiny as many judges were found guilty but not a single one punished.

Although Tajikistan has adopted democracy as its political ideology, the legacy of communism as its political culture continues. Any opposition to the government has always been suppressed with strong armed method by the Emomali Rahmon government. For instance, criminal proceedings were initiated against Abdulmalik Abdullojonov, former Prime Minister of Tajikistan and former leader of National Revival Movement (NRM) that drew its support from the Sogdh province, his brother the former mayor of Khujand Abdulghani Abdullojonov, and former Vice President Narzullo Dustov.

On June 11, 2003, Abdujalil Hamidov, a relative of Abdulmalik Abdullajonov, was sentenced for fifteen years for misappropriation and attempted assassination of President Rahmon in 1997. Hamidov was also linked to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Eighteen of his supporters were also sentenced for fifteen years of imprisonment. The trials were conducted in secrecy. The request of international observers to be part of the proceedings was denied. Hamidov’s other brother Abdulkhafiz Abdullaev was sentenced to death for attempt to assassination on the President. It is likely that these efforts were aimed to eliminate the Hamidov’s family as a political force. They all were popular leaders and strongly opposed the Rahmon regime.

In the period after the formal establishment of peace, after the signing of the reconciliation agreement, the most controversial trials of the opposition leaders was of Muhammadruzi Iskandarov, a prominent field commander of UTO during the civil war and head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan since 1999. He was one of the most popular leader and outspoken opponents of Rahmon. He was arrested in Moscow in December 2004. According to Russian Interior Ministry, the Tajik Prosecutor General’s office put Iskandarov on the international wanted list on suspicion of committing serious crimes, including terrorist acts and setting up illegal armed formations. Soon in April 2005 he was released by the Russian prosecutor general, who stated that they had no legal ground to detain him. However, he was immediately kidnapped by Tajik security services and ten days later Tajik prosecutor general announced that he was in an isolation detention camp in Dushanbe and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. According to ex-BBC reporter, “The day I interviewed Iskandarov for BBC, immediately after his release in Russia, the interview spread in Tajikistan like a wild fire in different newspapers…… Iskandarov was traded with the Tajik government and deported to Tajikistan……. In return of Iskandarov, Russia got the imperialist rights in Tajikistan.”

Apart from Iskandarov, Yakub Salimov, a former Popular Front commander, was arrested in Russia and sent to Tajikistan. He was sentenced to 15 years. Rustam Fayziev, deputy chairman of the unregistered Party of Progress was sentenced to five years; Nizomiddin Begmatov, Chairman of Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan was sentenced to one and a half years; and Qosim Rakhimov of IRPT remained in prison after the 2004 judgment.

Dovud and Sherali Nazriec were sentenced to death in May 2001 for attempting to assassinate Makhmadsaid Ubaydullayev, mayor of Dushanbe in February 2000. Serious doubts were raised on the fairness of the trial. These detentions, trials and verdicts were not only in violation of the International Arbitrary Detention laws but also against the peace agreement.

The conditions in the prisons remain harsh with bad sanitary conditions, overcrowded, and mistreatment during detention. Consequently, numerous prisoners commit suicide. Although there are incidences where alleged suicides remains suspicious. Suicide of Sadullo Marupov, a member of the IRP, in May 2006 raised doubts.

The Tajik government is able to maintain authoritarian rule because the Tajik opposition parties are regionally based, divided, unorganized, lack resources and remains unpopular amongst Tajik citizens due to government control over media and limited opportunities for them to propagate their policy. In addition, Rahmon is successful in portraying himself as a person who brought peace in the region and tainted the opposition for being responsible for the civil war. Consequently, no opposition movement can be sustained or demonstrations against government’s arbitrary policy can be organized. In fact, opposition to the government is often referred to as a derogatory term in Tajik society. It is because the country has recently witnessed a civil war and majority of population fear that any opposition might push them into another major crisis. Therefore opposition may not be in a position to secure support to their policies in the present social and political set-up.

There is no doubt that a strong centre and state is required for nation-building. But denying political accommodation to the opposition, in the strongly fragmented Tajik society based on ethno-regional identity, is likely to increase group resistance up to some verge beyond which extreme forces might adopt further and more violent opposition.

Russia and Central Asian Security

2008-03-01T23:48:00.016+05:30

Abstract

Russian economic, cultural and historical relations with Central Asia are older than the birth of the Soviet power in 1917. According to the Russian Orientalist Lev Gumilev, "Already by the end of 12th century one could visualize Russia and the great steppe, region as a single ethnographic space." [i]

The Central Asian region gained importance due to unprecedented resources that made the region a raw material appendage for the Russian manufacturing industries in the 20 th century. According to the western political scientists, the Soviet Union pursued colonial and exploitative policies in Central Asia. It also followed the traditional imperialist approach of divide and rule where the Russians acted as a catalyst. However Venyukov, while mentioning about the Cossacks, who for long time had been marrying the daughters of the Caucasian mountaineers said that, "We are not Englishmen, who in India do their utmost to avoid mingling with the native. Our strength, on the contrary lies in the fact that up to the present times we have assimilated subject race, mingling affable with them." [ii]

Devendra Kaushik noted that "when the disintegration of Soviet Union took place in December 1991 it was due to the urge of the pro-West democratic Russian elites to offload the burdensome Central Asian Republics in order to achieve a speedy modernization than the secessionist desire of the Central Asian ruling elite." [iii]

The first effort to reintegrate Russia and Central Asia came in the form of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), initially a 'lose alliance' between three Slavic nations formed on December 8, 1991 at Minsk. Finally, the Almaty Summit meeting provided the base for the evolution of regional organization based on issues concerning 'Eurasian space'. For instance its Article 7 deals with joint initiatives in foreign policy, creation of common economic space, transport, communication system, environmental protection, migration policy and suppression of organized crime. [iv] Amongst other things, the CIS can be said was initiated also to prevent West from gaining foothold in the region.

Owing to the civil war in Tajikistan, in 1993, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were created, wherein Russia shared maximum burden. At military level, the CIS failed to achieve desired results as during the civil war in Tajikistan, Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan failed to provide troops in symbolic form. It was only after the emergence of Taliban that the CIS members took active interest in countering the threat posed on the security of CIS states. It may be noted that earlier the six CIS states namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and Georgia formed Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent in 1992. It prohibited the member states from taking a joint action (with any other group of sates) against CST signatory.

In spite one of the founders of CST, in April 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew itself from the body and joined the US supported organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM) to get out of the Russian hegemony. However, GUUAM suffered from stagnated development. It was only after the series of revolution in some member states made many analysts speculate on the possible revival of GUUAM. However, in 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM following the persecution of Islamists in Andijon incidence as well as the Kazakhstan presidents' visit to Tashkent. Uzbekistan rejoined Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006.

Earlier at Minsk Summit in 2000, CST adopted a number of documents for strengthening security of the region. The most important among them was 'a memorandum of increasing the effectiveness of the CST and its ability to adapt to the present day geopolitical situation and a model for a regional collective security system'. In fact the 9/11 terrorist attack altered the regional security situation in Eurasia to a greater extent. Consequently the CSTO was formed by the remaining CST members in September 2002. The formation of CSTO was speculated to have been initiated to prevent NATOs military presence in the region under the garb of anti-terrorist campaign and its policy of eastward expansion that led to the development of NATOs Partnership for Peace program. In addition, the US transnational project (TRACECA) called for establishing a transport corridor (mainly for oil) between Europe and the Caucasian Asia. According to S.D.Muni, "Russia seemed to have mixed position on this. While ideally, Russia would prefer the US to stay away from the region in its strategic proximity there are indications that the US military presence in the region enjoys Russian approval, at least willing acquiescence, without which this presence could not be stable. This dual posture seems to have been governed by the larger Russian interest in the economic and strategic cooperation with the US and immediate interests of containing Islamic extremism, especially in Chechnya and around its strategic soft belly in Central Asia." [v]

Francois Heisbourge, noted that "President Vladimir Putin has clearly taken a real political risk in helping open the door of Central Asia to the US. Americans as the authors of Monroe Doctrine should have little trouble understanding that Moscow's cooperation was important in securing ready physical and durable political access to the states of Central Asia." [vi] Russian media has described this military presence as 'putting a color on the Yellow Dragon'. [vii]

The post 9/11 also saw Russian political elites taking keen interest in reintegrating the post-Soviet space. Addressing the journalist at the sideline of the 10 th anniversary of the CST held in May 2002, Vladimir Putin emphasized that the "Collective Security Treaty signatories are now establishing new organization have 'joined hands not against any third parties but threats they are facing'". He also said that "all actions by the anti-terrorist coalitions should be 'coordinated within the United Nations Security Council'". [viii]

Like CIS, another important institutional mechanism which emerged in an informal way is Shanghai Five, later renamed as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the admission of Uzbekistan in June 2001. The SCO has also created a Special Coordinating Body in April 2002, which brings the Russian and Chinese defence efforts in the region closer to each other. Like the CSTO, the SCO states demonstrated their capability to coordinate their fight against terrorist forces and transnational criminals, conducted their first ever military exercise known as 'Coalition 2003' in August 2003 in which all members except Uzbekistan participated. It may be noted that despite contradictions within CIS and SCO these states have been taking some initiatives to realize the goal of Eurasian integration. It is important to note that initially SCO was not an exclusive organization and was open to all and was not directed against anyone. Essentially, it is a better regional organization.

It is interesting to note that despite differences among the states of Eurasia, one issue, which unites all these states, is the issue of external observation of election in the CIS states. The observers of OSCE always criticize all the presidential and parliamentary elections as unfair and cite use of dubious means by elected candidates. On the other hand the observers of CIS states justify the elections as fair. Taking a strong exception to the OSCEs perception on the election in the post-Soviet space on July 3, 2004 after the 'rose revolution in Georgia, the presidents of Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan criticized the election observation process of the OSCE and some other western NGOs.

Not only at political level but also at economic level, the CIS members took active interest in promoting regional cooperation like in the initial years single economic zone was created, Economic Union Treaty was signed to provide impetus to Free Trade and also to create a 'customs union with reduced internal tariffs and common external tariffs', free trade zone and customs and settlement union.

The present paper also takes a critical look at the post-Soviet period with regard to the trade balance between Russia and Central Asia that has been predominantly in Russia 's favor, largely because Russian exports to the region have been mainly finished products with high added value, while exports from Central Asia to Russia have mainly been raw material. This should not be viewed as neo-imperialism but post imperialism as Russia is well aware of the fact that it can not survive on the basis of imperialist policies. Russia has hardly any economic clout and is not ideologically sound enough to practice neo-imperialism. This post-imperialism is referred to as by Devendra Kaushik as 'soft power' due to Russia's economic consolidation, foreign exchange increase of Russia because of oil and gas, and increase in trade and investment by Russia in Central Asia. In addition, Russian language opens door for greater economic opportunities which should not be taken as neo-imperialism but as post imperialism and a thing to be welcomed. It is important for Central Asia to adopt Nehruvian approach that aims for widening area of peace and reducing area of war that arises due to competitive organizations within region.

Remembering February 1990: Summary of Events

2008-02-25T13:19:00.011+05:30

(Bahmanmah-A friends remark)
Published in Tajikistanweb.com in English and Cyrillic Persian
http://tajikistanweb.com/250208_bahmanmah.html

The dress rehearsal of the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) started with the rumour about the arrival of Armenians who were to be housed in new homes in the capital of Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR), Dushanbe, in May 1989, thus intruding the rights of the native inhabitants who had been waiting for their turn.*

On 11 February 1990, a few days before the elections, an unofficial rally was organized outside the Tajik Communist Party's Central Committee building. The participants of the rally were mainly young people and unorganised political groups. Slogans like "Down with Armenians!" were echoed. These protesters insisted that Armenians should return back to their homes and demanded microphones. Subsequently, state of emergency was declared and some 5,000 Soviet troops were sent to Dushanbe to suppress protests. According to official reports the civil unrest resulted in the death of 25 young men and about 70 people were injured by police and army bullets.

In a report by Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), Dadajan Ismailov, head of the Tajik State University said that, "The Tajik people have always been known for their friendliness and hospitality. It is impossible to believe that the arrival of a few refugees from the Caucasus could cause such a stormy reaction."

Ismailov further mentioned that "there were organizers behind crowd and its actions are being directed by someone. There is no doubt that these people want to force their way into power this way. As there was no coincidence that such events developed precisely on the eve of the republic’s Supreme Soviet elections. That would hinder the electoral process. Such justifications were supported by D.Karimov, the then First Secretary of the City Party Committee, who admitted that a year ago the city’s inhabitant welcomed cordially and with traditional hospitality the refugees from the earthquake regions in Armenia and gave them temporary shelters."

The Soviet policy of glasnost brought euphoria amongst the cultural elites of some Soviet republics. In Tajikistan, the ethno-cultural elites wanted to create 'Tajik cultural renaissance' that was fading under the Russian and Turkic cultural dominance. There is no doubt that the people who pushed the movement of February 1990, were led by the people who were behind the cultural change in the late 1980’s. Their initial success in officially establishing a Tajik ethno-nationalist state where Tajik language was made official, gave the cultural elites courage to adopt democratic means for political change. These cultural elites became political in Tajik SSR when they demanded political accommodation in an exclusively Khojandi power structure.

The political revolution got support of economic breakdown in Soviet Union. Being at the periphery the economic crisis had the worst effect on Tajik SSR. The security situation got fragile after the deployment of Soviet military in February 1990 that created a garrison state. It led to a sense of curtailment of freedom leading to subsequent reactions. Dushanbe witnessed conflict, pogroms, excesses and robberies from 11-14 February 1990. The people involved in robberies were not necessarily the one who were participants of the demonstrations but the ones who were already involved in the nefarious activities and tried to benefit from the social, political and economic crisis.

In another report of SWB of February 1990, the Armenians who returned from Dushanbe told at the Zvartnots airport that the events of Tajikistan followed the same notorious scenario as Sumgaiti and Baku. The refugees explained that the Tajik people have always been friendly towards Armenians, and in these grave days many of them defended and protected them and expressed their indignation at the extremists’ actions. The report noted that earlier representatives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front arrived in Tajikistan to provoke anti-Armenian sentiments. They distributed large amounts of money and drugs, specifically to young people, and instigated them to expel all foreigners (first the Armenians) topple the local authorities and create an Islamic state.

It could be possible that ethno-nationalist sentiments were motivated due to internal political, economic and civic crisis not just in Tajik SSR but in the entire Soviet Union. At the same time it is unlikely that the demonstrators wanted to establish an Islamic state as the Tajik society was not ready for a religious revolution. The official clergy headed by Haji Akbar Turanjonzoda, regarded as the chief of the Islamic democrats and a powerful figure in Tajik society and polity, while answering to the question "Will Tajikistan become an Islamic republic?" mentioned that "Even if all the mullahs want this, at the moment it is not possible. The republic has gone a long way down the secular path and people will not renounce their habits and way of life so easily. I support a secular parliamentary state with a free economy. Religion should be separated from the state so that the sins of society cannot be attributed to Islam, which is what happened to the Communist Party." Turajonzoda also stated that only 3 percent of the country’s inhabitants knew the prayers correctly.

Said Abdullah Nuri, a charismatic Islamist leader, was another prominent opposition political figure of Tajikistan during the internal war (1992-1997). In late 1980’s, Nuri aligned with the young activists who formed the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). He became the leader of religious political organisation called Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan. Earlier in 1986, he was imprisoned for 18 months along with forty others for protesting in Kurgan Teppa in support of Afghanistani mujahideens’ attack from area around Imam Sahib and for producing and disseminating ‘religious propaganda’ into Soviet Tajikistan. After his release in 1988, he changed his name from Abdullah Saidov to Said Abdullah Nuri and was invited to work with the official Tajik religious administration, the Qaziyat. It was only in 1990s that Nuri became a prominant figure in Tajik society and polity. He fought against the government forces and headed the United Tajik Opposition for peace negotiation with Tajik government.

Muhiddin Kabiri, Nuri’s successor, is regarded to be representing a minority moderate faction of IRPT. He is still trying to establish his authority within the party that is dominated by traditionalist. At the same time it is unlikely that he will be dethroned as in Tajik tradition there is a famous couplet "If a boss asks to bring the hat, he or she brings it with a head".

Moreover, Kabiri's businessman like appearance and his "moderate" label do not intimidate secular Tajiks who are clear about one thing that they do not want to end up being like Afghanistan, promoting Islamic extremism. Moreover, Soviet period led to women emancipation in Tajik society. Presently, the role of women in Tajik society can not be marginalised. Though women are not likely to be future leaders of Tajikistan, they have a demographic advantage due to mass migration of working male population to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States for work. Internationally, Islamists remain unpopular amongst their Central Asian neighbours and western countries, including Russia.

It is often referred to that the members of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) were completely unaware about the Islamic restrictions. During their stay in Iran, after Imomali Rahmon came to power and started persecuting the leaders of the opposition, it became difficult for them to adopt Islamic way of life.

Soon after the fateful events of 11-14 February 1990, the following three days were declared the days of popular mourning. Rallies were organized at Lenin Square in support of the mourning for the innocent people who were killed during the unrest provoked in Dushanbe. The participants demanded raising living standards and reconsidering cotton prices. Tajiks, Russians, Uzbeks, Germans and Tatars who formed a self-defence groups not only rallied against militants and provided security to the people but were also involved in the renovation of the city.

Soon thousands of people took part and the leaders of the unofficial organizations renewed their call for political and economic reforms and voiced support for perestroika. There were banners that read "We are for Gorbachev, friendship with the Russians forever" and calls were made for the republican leadership to resign.

In the meantime, loud speakers were installed in the streets so that there could be direct transmission of the proceedings of the extraordinary plenum. In addition, there was continuous radio broadcast in which appeals were made to help the government trace the culprits who provoked against the Armenian refugees. Though the country suffered heavy economic losses in February, government raised the salaries of professionals and prices of goods were reduced to contain the socio-economic unrest.

In view of the prevailing unrest Qahhar Mahkamov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of Tajikistan’s Communist Party submitted his resignation but was rejected on 15 February 1990. Elections were held on 27 February 1990, under state of emergency. Despite of hunger-strike being organized by the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and other informal organizations Mahkamov was elected as the first President of the Soviet Tajikistan with an absolute majority.

Buri Karimov, Chairman of the Planning Committee (who was earlier abused of a failed coup attempt), and Nur Tabarov, Minister of Culture, were removed from their posts in March 1990 on charges of their role in the mass disturbances in Dushanbe in February. Despite the February incidence, the Khojand elite openly made an exclusive clan based political and administrative structure.

In an article published in May 1990 by A.Kruhilin in SWB, mentioned that in a city hospital, 250 Russian doctors submitted applications to leave. In addition, the overwhelming majority of those injured [during the skirmish] were Russians; all those assaulted were Russians; 82 percent of those who left Tajikistan since the beginning of the year were Russian.

The mass departure of the non-native population was not necessarily because of the language policy as the implementation of such policy requires lot of time and infrastructure and Tajikistan had none. The migration was particularly due to political, social and economic destabilization in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.
--------------------------
* A year prior to these events (January 23, 1989) a massive earthquake hit Dushanbe suburbs leaving thousands of people homeless in Hissar district. Sharara village of the district was buried under a 17 meter landslide. All 600 inhabitans of Sharara died. An earlier quake hit Armenia killing an estimated 25 000 people. Moscow was trying to accommodate thousands of Armenian homeless throughout the Soviet Union (tajikistanweb).

THE RIVER THAT DIVIDES

2008-02-24T02:06:00.006+05:30

The road connecting Dushanbe to Khorog runs along the River Panj. It is interesting to compare the two parts of the same world. The roads in Tajikistan are well made while in Afghanistan there are no pakka roads. The bridges are made up of concrete on the Tajik side while in Afghanistan the bridges are made up of ropes and wood. On Tajik side the automobile is used for traveling or commercial purpose that can take the speed up to 100 km per hour while on the Afghanistan side the donkeys are used as means of transportation. One can find a continuous electric cable running along the roadside in Tajikistan while there are no electric cables on the Afghan side. The houses are made up of bricks in Tajikistan while in Afghanistan the houses are made up of mud. It is greener in Tajikistan than Afghanistan. The cattle in Tajikistan are more healthy and fat than in Afghanistan. The milk is carried from Tajikistan to Afghanistan in vehicles and within Afghanistan the milk is carried on the donkey back to get distributed to the customers. The women are covered from head to toe in Afghanistan while in Tajikistan the women just wear a scarf on their heads. In fact, in summers the cloths of the females in Khorog are more Europeanized. The place of women in Badakshon, particularly amongst the Ismailis is above the male member. In Afghanistan the idea of women emancipation does not exist.
The air route from Dushanbe to Khorog is the most difficult flying zone as it is at high altitude that passes through ‘fan of mountains’. It looks like a Japanese or Chinese traditional fan from the plane. In fact the plane flies over Afghanistan for a short while before getting back to Tajikistan and land on Khorog airport.

A teacher in Murghab noted: “Even during the Soviet Union time, the so-called most prosperous period, here in Murghab we did not have more than two TV channels and only the most well-connected people had color TVs. Now, with easy access to cheap Chinese products, most of the families in Murghab enjoy the 32 channels that can be accessed through satellite antennas that most households now possess” (Naimov 2006).

IDEA BEHIND REDISCOVERING TAJIKS PERSIAN IDENTITY

2008-02-09T19:45:00.010+05:30

Published in Tajikistanweb.com in English and Cyrillic Persian
Darius Rajabian contributed to this article

In another effort to revive Samanid Persian culture and language amongst Sovietised (Russified) Tajiks, the governments of Iran and Tajikistan have planned to jointly celebrate the 1150th birth anniversary of the Persian poet Abu Abdullah Jafar-ibn-Mohammad Rudaki (858-941) in 2008. Rudaki's birthplace is now located in Tajikistan and he is recognized as the founder of the Persian (Tajik) literature. He was one of the earliest exponents of modern literary Persian in Perso-Arabic script. Those who believe that Rudaki was a follower of the Ismaili branch of Islam usually cite Maruf Balkhi, a Samanid poet, as saying: "I have heard the king of poets, Rudaki as saying, "Do not give allegiance to anyone, save the Fatimids (the first Ismaili dynasty)."

Tajikistan and Iran plan to organize a series of comprehensive programmes, including seminars and literary festivals, to be held under the agreement signed between Iran's Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicraft Organization (CHTHO) and Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (ASRT). The programs are scheduled in several Iranian cities and in the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe. UNESCO also plans to commemorate Rudaki through holding projects with the support of Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

The Samanid royal dynasty is regarded as the founder of the modern Tajik national identity. It was during their reign that the word "Tajik" came into prominence ["Tajik" is derived from Tāzīk/g (Middle Persian) and Tāzī (New Persian) denote non-Turkic, Iranian]. Samanids revived Persian culture and language that was washed away after the conquest of Arabs. It is noteworthy that the changes which took place during this time, occupied every sphere of life: cultural, linguistic, social, art, economy, politics, and scientific.

American scholar Richard Frye observes that the process of Persian renaissance began in Central Asia rather than in Iran. It was due to the difference of the social groups in these two parts of the Muslim world. The mercantile, trade society of Central Asia was much more suitable for the development of an egalitarian Islamic society than a hierarchical caste society of Iran. Therefore, the Samanids, the real rulers of Transoxiana, who made Bukhara, Samarkand and Herat as centres for learning Persian culture throughout the eastern part of the Persian-speaking world, could be seen as pioneers of Iranian renaissance.

In the present times, Tajiks seek cultural guidance from Iran for the restoration of their Persian identity which they share with Iran and Afghanistan. It is because Iran was able to preserve the Persian identity while during the Soviet period Tajiks not only lost their cultural capitals to Uzbekistan, but also their distinctive identity was almost distorted by Russian ethno-national identity. At the same time, Soviet atheistic policy made Tajiks secular and religiously ignorant. Their cultural identity supersedes sectarian differences with Iran. Majority of Tajiks are Sunni whereas the majority of Iranians adhere to Shiite Islam.

In late 1980s, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, a policy of openness in public discussions about current and historical problems, led to peoples' movement for cultural revival in some of the Soviet republics. Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR) was the only former Soviet Central Asian republic where people organised a cultural movement that led to the passage of a language law in 1989. The language law officially renamed "Tajiki (Farsi)" as national language of TSSR and called for gradual reintroduction of the Perso-Arabic alphabet. The word in brackets (Farsi) was omitted later by Rahmon's government.

Presently, the 'cultural renaissance' is a movement initiated by the political elites where the local population remains apathetic towards such efforts. Schools, media and celebration of cultural festivals are used as mediums by the government to reinforce Tajik national identity.

In 1999, Tajik government celebrated 1100th anniversary of the Samanid Empire. The efforts to endorse cultural renaissance in Tajikistan is for nation-building, protecting cultural uniqueness amongst their Turkic Central Asian neighbours and maintaining secular beliefs in the country. In an effort to counterbalance Islam, Tajik government celebrated 2700th anniversary of Zoroastrian holly script Avesta in 2001.

Tajik leadership has shown more signs of being disinterested to promote ethno-religious identity and has undertaken measures to restrain Islam from taking roots in social and political structure of Tajikistan. In this regard, government has implemented some severe measures like closing and even bulldozing of "illegal" mosques, banning women from wearing hijaab (head scarves) and miniskirts in educational institutions, making it compulsory for male students at the Islamic University of Tajikistan to dress in suits and ties and shave their beards, introducing uniforms for teachers and bringing in a Tajik pattern of naming newborn children.

The idea to contain Islamic identity has manifold objectives. First, it would weaken the social and political position of the Islamists, the only substantial political opposition in Tajikistan. Secondly, Islamic revolution will be antagonistic to Iranian religious identity, which might deter Tajik-Iran multi-faceted relations and is likely to bring strong reactions from their Central Asian neighbours and western countries. Finally, encouraging religious identity might push the country into dark ages particularly due to the absence of strong political ideology and dearth in economic opportunities in Tajikistan.

Interview in Radio Zamaneh

2008-02-09T19:41:00.008+05:30

Following link to my brief conversation with Dariush Rajabian of Radio Zamaneh on the streets of London on India and Tajikistan : Mirror Image
http://radiozamaaneh.com/dariush/2007/11/post_107.html

India and Ayni : Idealism verses Realism

2008-02-09T19:28:00.007+05:30

Published in Tajikistanweb.com in English and Cyrillic Persian
http://tajikistanweb.com/120208_indiataj.html

Recently the Indian media has highlighted strategic importance of Ayni air base renovated by Indian assistance in Tajikistan. To begin with, India has signed a trilateral agreement with the Government of Tajikistan and Russia to refurbish the Ayni base. In this regard India has been providing technical help and construction of the runway, aircraft hangars and air-control tower. India has maintained its presence at the Ayni base since 2002, spending an estimated $ 1.7 million. In 2003, India conducted its first-ever overseas military exercise with Tajikistan. This included two IAF Antonov 32 transport aircraft that demonstrated their lift capability and a platoon-strength of Special Forces that carried out parachute jumps and other commando exercises. Presently, there are over 150 Indian military personnel stationed at Ayni, which includes an IAF detachment of pilots and support staff for Mi-17 helicopters.

There is a difference between having rights to refurbish an air base and enjoying right to use the air base for military or civilian purpose. In September 2007, when there were reports and discussion on Ayni Air base, Tajik defense ministry clarified that "There are too many rumors around the Ayni aerodrome. At the beginning they claimed that Indian military contingent would be deployed there, and now they say French ones. This aerodrome is a property of Tajikistan, and it is up to the Tajik government and the Defence Ministry to decide who will be deployed there after the reconstruction."

Ayni air base definitely provides strategic depth to India in the sub-continent particularly against its traditional rivals- China and Pakistan. As for Tajikistan, giving India right to have military base will mean straining its relations with China and Pakistan.

Tajikistan and China
Tajikistan-China relation started with contentious border issues that were to be resolved under Shangai Five [now called Shangahi Cooperation Organisation (SCO)]. The most difficult section of border sharing in the Pamirs remained unresolved due to Chinese claim on a considerable part of the Badakshon region. Recently, China has been successful in developing significant relations with Tajikistan. At present, China is one of the biggest investor in Tajikistan. China's interest in Tajikistan arises from its desire to revive ancient Silk Route and both countries share the same apprehensions on the Islamists design. The leadership of Tajikistan has often recognized Chinese as their big brothers (big brothers for Tajiks does not mean that Chinese would dictate their terms) and great neighbors.

China objective to revive the ancient Silk Route and connecting Tajikistan with the Karakoram highway is aimed at seeking an easy access to Central Asian market. During the Chinese Premier's visit to Dushanbe in June 2006, various bilateral cooperation agreements were signed between the two countries. The most important of them all was the reconstruction of the Dushanbe-Chanak highway that forms part of the old Silk Route running from Kulma (south-east Tajikistan and at Chinese border) to Khorog-Darvaz-Kulyab-Dushanbe and the Dushanbe-Khujand-Buston-Chanak highway. This highway would then connect to Uzbekistan. China has also agreed to finance LEP-500 North-South high-voltage power line; its viability study was conducted during the Soviet times. The plan is likely to supply electricity from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan and 220 kv power line Lolazor-Obimazor-Khatlon that would extend to Faizabad area in the Badakshan province of Afghanistan. It is also likely that China wants to develop its western Xinjiang province in order to marginalize the Ughars rebels of western Chinese province bordering Tajikistan's eastern GBAO.

China is actively and aggressively involved in diverse projects in Tajikistan including construction and exporting commodities. The International Monitory Fund report of March 2007 noted that the total loans provided by China are "Although concessional in nature (with grant of 40 percent), the disbursement of these loans will lead to a rapid reaccumulation of debt." A large number of Chinese offices have recently opened in Tajikistan. Consequently, Tajiks have been showing interests in sending their children to China for learning Chinese language. The knowledge of Chinese language may provide them better job opportunities.

Tajikistan and Pakistan
Pakistan was fervently involved in Tajik civil war of 1990s. Pakistan gave refuge and provided support to the Tajik Islamist opposition for continuation of Tajik civil war. In February 1993, in an interview with Interfax in Moscow, Tajik president Imomali Rahmon stated that "Pakistani transport planes were making daily flights to northern Afghanistan to deliver food and arms to refugee camps in the area where Tajik militants were said to be undergoing training by Afghan mojahideen." Earlier, in a Summary of World Broadcast report of August 1991, Anatoliya Belousov, Tajik KGB Deputy Chairman mentioned that "The armed Afghan opposition was being manipulated and schools had been set up in Afghan settlement near the border to give 'military and religious training to young Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens so that they can subsequently be used to carry out hostilities against the USSR'." Pakistan's intervention in Tajikistan was in continuation with Zia-ul Haq's policy of creating a 'zone of strategic depth' in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Kashmir. These policies were aimed to bring the region under Islamabad's command and to find a gateway to Central Asia for economic, strategic and religious purposes.

In the post-civil war, Tajikistan and Pakistan has been developing its relations. The first Tajik Ambassador to Pakistan Saidbeg Saidov was appointed three months before Tajikistan President Imomali Rahmon's visit to India in August 2006. Pakistan and Tajikistan have also signed about twenty agreements, protocols and memorandums of understanding (MoU's) to extend cooperation in diverse fields on the basis of mutual equality and increase the level of trade. Both countries have been working on the energy transmission line project from Tajikistan to Pakistan via Phule-Khumri and Kabul areas. They have also agreed to cooperate in field of explorations, extraction and processing of gas and oil products. Pakistan has constructed a land route from Totkhum-Jalalabad in Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Tajikistan being landlocked nation traditionally depends on Uzbekistan for imports and exports but certain irritants have caused economic hardship in Tajikistan. The Karakoram highway connecting China and Pakistan to Gwadar port in Pakistan provides alternate trade-route to land locked Tajikistan.

Tajikistan and India
As for Tajikistan-India relations, they shares historical ties. For a common Tajik, India is known as Hindustan. Every Tajik dreams of visiting India to see Taj Mahal, which they reflect on as their ancestors' monument and till date Taj Mahal rates above any other foreign tourist destination. Indian cinema is very popular and most young men felt sad hearing the news about Aishwarya Rai's wedding. Despite of having immense fondness for India, Tajiks don't hesitate to show their concern over Indo-US nuclear collaboration at the cost of Iran and Russia's friendship.

India's efforts to develop bilateral relations with Tajikistan are constrained by the psychological distance between the two countries. According to the Foreign Aid Report of 2005, India is one of the few countries providing huge grants to Tajikistan and is involved in the export of important commodities (at the same time it is observed that the Indian products are not visible in Tajik market that is completely taken over by Chinese goods). In addition, India is involved in a few construction projects, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, providing scholarship to Tajik students for higher education in India, and there are more than 200 Indian students studying in the Medical College in Dushanbe. Most of these projects remained at inter-governmental level. The private organizations remain inactive in Tajikistan due to connectivity problem, unfriendly environment for investment, endemic corruption and limited market.

Although India shares good relations with Central Asian countries, Tajiks believe that having India's military base might disturb geo-strategic relations in the region. Boasting about India's airbase in Tajikistan that is still not a reality may act against India's future interest in the region as it would present India as a nation aiming to militarize the region.

At the same time, Russia plays an important role in Tajikistan's strategic decision making. In the post-disintegration of Soviet Union, Russia became an important player in Tajik civil war, peace resolution, and nation building. Even when Tajikistan was facing crisis during the internal war, Russia never showed its direct intention to colonize the region. It was also because during that time Russia itself was trying to cope with its own economic and security crisis and Tajikistan has always been an economic encumber due to it tough terrains and limited resources. Despite disappointment by Tajiks over Russia's pro-Uzbekistan policy and more or less abandonment of Tajikistan after Andijon, Tajiks still consider Russians as their traditional mentors. Although, Russia remains the biggest supplier of arms to India, there has been souring relations between India and Russia on Indo-US budding relations. The recent developments in international politics is likely to negatively affect India's desire to have its first overseas defence establishment.

In the recent past, joint military and anti-terrorist exercises under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and SCO, respectively have been a success. In addition, the military exercises and the prospective military presence under the regional organizations do not disturb or threaten regional peace.

Forthcoming

2007-06-11T19:04:00.002+05:30

Tohir Abdurjabbar, Leader, Rastakhez
Shokirjon, Deputy, Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan

In coversation with Mr.Muhiddin Kabiri

2007-06-08T09:42:00.002+05:30

Interview with Mr.Kabiri, Leader IRPT, by Mansi Mehrotra, on 24th April 2007
Mr. Muhiddin Kabiri, the deputy chairman of the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)

Me in Tajikistan

2007-06-04T09:31:00.006+05:30

http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/tajikistan/story/2007/04/070430_d_entertainment.shtml

NOTE

I KNOW I AM 5 Kg.s extra and please don't forward it to Animal Rights activists.
What to do am vegetarian and the only thing for me was fried potato's and fruit juice (coz no clean drinking water)....

Tajikistan: Some Reflections

2007-06-04T09:20:00.003+05:30

Communiqué with Ambassador M.K.Bhadrakumar on 2nd June 2007
A.MKB: My impression has been that Kabiri doesn't have the charisma of Nuri. It's doubtful if he can arrest the IRPT's decline (which is partly due to the government's manipulation, but not entirely).
Me: I had never seen Nuri so I can’t comment. Kabiri is still young and has not evolved out of the civil war. He is still in the process of establishing his position within the party. But the fact is if you ask the local population from north to south the new generation is not even aware of the political parties, they say that there is one Democratic Party of President Rahmon, (Tajik’s cant tell the complete name of it) and there is one Islamic party. If you ask them about the leader of the opposition party or parties you'll find them looking blankly at you. So as you had mentioned Politics is not a greater issue for them than economy.
A.MKB.: Iran has dissociated itself from the IRPT, as far as I can see. Without some degree of regional patronage, IRPT will be having an uphill task in withstanding the govt pressure tactic. What is your impression?
Me: Socially and politically, IRPT still has a long way to go.
Most people in diplomatic circles and International NGO's fear the slow penetration of IRPT in the social milieu of Tajikistan as they will not fail to cite the example of a Kabodian (one of the base of IRPT) where just before the 2000 parliamentary elections Nuri was to deliver his speech. The local election control board did not make the required arrangements and did not inform the people but still there was a huge gathering as the people were informed by the local mullah’s. This most people think as slow and steady progress of IRPT, other examples usually quoted are opening of the mosques and prayer houses and the considerate activities of mullah's who are in many cases members of the IRPT. But these can not be seen as real threat.
In reality "The history is written by the victorious". People are brainwashed about the fact that IRPT was responsible for the civil war and Rahmon credited for bringing peace. Being an “Islamic” party people also look at it with suspicion as Tajik’s are clear about one thing that they don't want to be like Afghanistan.
IRPT supported the Pamiries during the civil war. Even the Badakshonies do not want to see IRPT coming to power.
About Iran, Tajik's feel very close to Iran and their Persian identity overrules their religious differences. When I reached Tajikistan first question was asked "Why did India voted against Iran?"
Though many people told me that the government is watchful about the activities of Iran in Tajikistan and Tajik government has even rejected registration to some important Iranian citizens. Having said that, recently some Mullahs came from Iran to conduct mass Muslim weddings in Tajikistan where they gave good dowry to the newly weds as well. In addition, Iran is involved in some economic projects in Tajikistan.
Fragile International position of Iran does not permit Iran to make more enemies. Moreover, siding with IRPT, though traditional allies of Iran, Iran has no religious gains. Few months back there was a bomb explosion in front of the Iranian embassy, a teaser and a warning to tell Iran to watch its activities in Tajikistan.
A.MKB: Geopolitically speaking, the international community doesn't want to upset the apple cart in Dushanbe. As such, the regional security situation is highly volatile. No one wants to exacerbate the tensions.
Me: I feel Tajikistan is an abandoned child. Moreover, Tajik government has been quite watchful about the activities of international NGO's. The representatives of International NGO's and International News agencies will first ask, "Do you have the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Education to conduct an interview?" and the guidelines like, please don't quote us etc. follows.
A.MKB: What is your impression of the US support for IRPT as a democratic force? My feeling is that US must be wary of IRPT. What do you think?
Me: No second opinion. True. But US itself is not seen as a friend or a well wisher by the Tajik's. Presently it’s hard to foresee US sitting at the driver’s seat.
A.MKB: Are more strident Islamist forces appearing in Tajikistan, which may elbow out IRPT in due course -- such as Hezb-e-Tahrir?
Me: Not within the present political and social set up. Though, they might be working at the ground level in the villages. But they might need a strong political and popular leader like Ayatollah Seyyed Ruhollah Khomeini to reverse the situation, which is currently just not possible. Moreover these organizations lack financial resources to sustain themselves, national support and organizational skills. The idea’s like Jihad is not easily understood and does not revoke any feeling.
A.MKB: My overall impression is Rakhmon is firmly in control; people are more concerned about the stability and the bread and butter issues rather than 'democracy'.
Me: Yes President Rahmon feels quite confident and had even asked the opposition leader to take part in the recent November 2006 Presidential elections. This is because people are not aware about the opposition. Opposition is in fact sometimes considered as a derogatory term in Tajik society.
For the locals Rahmon is a very intelligent and good looking man and believe me if you ask the female population they will say that he is so tall and good looking he stands out in the crowd. They are proud of him. His personality rules. Moreover, when he talks about Tajikistan people think that he is so knowledgeable, he has recently published a book on the history of Tajikistan, He has even got over the handicap of fluency in spoken Russian language. He has captured the psyche of people by putting his pictures at all the important places and he is always on TV and newspapers. It's a good marketing strategy. He has no competition but with himself.
In addition, the corruption is so high that people have started living with it and feel that all are same. A known devil is better than an unknown.
To anticipate a revolution from within is a distant reality that requires people’s awareness of their rights and would require understanding of new imposed political ideology, "Democracy". (Maybe the new generation that has not seen the closed and feared communist system, evils of civil war and are slowly getting exposed to the western ideas like liberalism may takeup a fight against the 'authoritarian' rule).
A.MKB: What is the extent of Russian influence? Is it in any way declining?
Tajik's are always filled with gratitude when they talk about Russia as the Soviet time was golden time for them, reasons you know. They do not want to part with Russia under any circumstances. But the recent change in Russian Foreign Policy that is tilting towards Uzbekistan, with whom Tajikistan is slowly developing bitter relations, is making Tajiks feel alienated.
When we study politics we also study that the country that controls the economy, controls the polity. China is entering in a big way. Though it is not likely that China will be ever able to replace Russia but maybe it will be able to marginalize Tajikistan's economic dependence on Russia.

ABSTRACT- CHINA AND INDIA IN CENTRAL ASIA

2007-02-02T15:23:00.004+05:30

Disintegration of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic in 1991, led to the emergence of fifteen new sovereign republics on the political map of the world. Among them, five Central Asian Republics (CARs) i.e. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan acquired an independent status. The geo-strategic importance of Central Asia region was recognized much before these nations became part of the Soviet Russia as it was not only on the crossroads of the ancient Silk Route but also formed part of the region where the Great Game, between Russian and the British empire, was played in the nineteenth century. During the Soviet regime presence of unprecedented resources made CARs a conspicuous attraction for the Soviet Duma. Old players have been replaced by new players in the region who are fighting the traditional war now referred to as "The New Great Game", due to the changed rules of the international system. This development has falsified the Francis Fukoyama's thesis of the end of the history.

According to many current international estimates, globally China is number two and India is number six energy consumer. Due to the expanding economy of both countries and their aspirations of becoming the world power in next 20 years, the energy needs are likely to be ten rounds more than the present level.

Geographically, Central Asia is the immediate neighbor of China and extended neighbour of India.

In the present scenario the importance of the region for India and China, a reason for competition and cooperation between the two, arises due to few factors: first, the presence of natural resources like natural gas, oil, dense river network and fertile soil; the rise of Islamic extremism; geo-political status of these countries form a buffer zone between the east and west; economic importance as the region facilitates potential cross-road of commerce and trades between east and west and between north and south (Silk Route); and the desire of international actors to balance the power struggle in the region.
Despite the fact that bilateral trade between India and China has already crossed US$ 20 billion mark in the current financial year and as President Hu Zintao has declared in his November 2006 New Delhi visit that it will be double in next four years, the fact remains that how long India and China will be able to sustain present euphoria of bilateral relations. We can not avoid pondering over the history and present issues of Indo-Chinese relation that are based on the foundation that includes thorny border issue; Pakistan factor; defence that includes nuclear weapons and arms race including the Chinese recent ascent anti-satellite space test (ASAT) on 11 January 2007 where Bejing’s went ahead with “hard kill” (shooting down the satellite) rather than “soft kill” (using laser to disable the satellite for a limited purpose); and the continuous struggle between the two nations to maintain spheres of political, economic, psychological and ideological influence in South Asia.
With regard to Central Asia, ethnically it shares traditional linkages and resemblance with both India and China. Economically Central Asia needs massive investment to develop their infrastructure especially in science and technology sector to further explore and exploit its rich resources. The presence of both India and China will not only help in the economic development but will also alleviate balance of power in Central Asia.
Although the competition between India and China seems to be hypothetical at this point of time due to China having an edge over India both economically and strategically. India needs to do extraordinary hard work to cope with the situation.

Abstract for Students' Seminar on 29 January 2007

2007-01-20T14:06:00.000+05:30

End of Cold War witnessed an evolving demographic panorama engendering resurgence of ethnic identities and associated conflicts. These events have created fragile national and international security environment.
Study of ethnicity and its role in nation-building process requires appreciative understanding of multidisciplinary approach towards a whole range of composite dynamics that act together in generating centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the given society.

This paper seeks to explore primordial ethnic bonds, as described by Anthony D.Smith, which are used as an instrument by political, social, economic and intellectual elites, and interest and status groups for the purpose of social manipulation that are meant to achieve specific social, political and economic projects, as acknowledged by Paul Brass and Cohen.

The case study of Tajikistan is particularly interesting for the reason that revival of ethnic identities and the task of nation-building requires understanding the role of both national and international actors. Factors effecting Tajik ethnic identity at national level involves examining Tajik history, religion, regionalism (here regionalism implies study of domestic regional politics), and language. The paper will also briefly examine the role played by international actors like Russia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran in alleviating resurgence of ethno-regional identities in Tajikistan.

Persisting debate on unequal distribution of power in the politics and administration at central power structure and economic disparity between various ethnic groups has facilitated mistrust and insecurity that has provided a fertile ground for the opposition in presenting strong Islamic stance, which easily underpins national and international appeal. This formulate a pertinent issue that in the fragmented Tajik society severity of government force directed against any ethnic group is likely to increase group resistance, up to some verge beyond which extreme forces might adopt further and more violent opposition.

This paper is an attempt to critically analyse nation-building process by studying the role of state in ethnic reformulation and political accommodation on one hand and humanitarian intervention on the other. The paper derives its conclusion from Jenonne Walker statement that "it is easier to prevent ethnic crises by addressing to the problems rather than try to resolve it." In this regard the preventive measures for Tajik ethnic situations will address to the question about: what can national and international actors usefully do to ease tensions between and among potentially hostile ethnic groups?